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Chapter 1 
 
General Introduction 
The three studies of this dissertation shed light on the determinants and 
consequences of financial reporting quality. Chapter 2 examines the economic 
consequences of accounting quality in a setting that is characterized by low demand for 
high quality financial reporting. Chapters 3 and 4 focus on audit- specific determinants of 
financial reporting quality. In particular, chapter 3 investigates the association between 
auditor size and audit quality in a low litigation, reputation, and regulatory scrutiny setting. 
Chapter 4 explores the interplay between auditor political connections and audit quality. 
Accounting research concludes that accounting quality has economic consequences 
for public firms. Financial reporting quality mitigates information asymmetry between the 
firm and its capital providers and therefore alleviates adverse selection concerns. 
Consistent with this argument, prior research has repeatedly documented a strong link 
between attributes of accounting earnings and public firm’s cost of debt and equity. It is 
not ex- ante certain, however, that this relation would persist in the private firm setting, 
where the demand for high quality financial reporting is substantially weaker. Private firms 
typically develop insider communication channels with their stakeholders. They therefore 
rely less on publicly available financial statements to communicate their true economic 
performance. Chapter 2 investigates the relation between attributes of accounting earnings 
and private firms’ access to two main sources of financing: bank debt and trade credit 
capital. To this end, I use a sample of private firms from the European Union’ five largest 
economies (UK, Germany, Italy, France, and Spain) during the period 1997- 2010. Results 
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indicate that high quality financial reporting is associated with lower cost of debt and 
lower levels of short to total debt. Furthermore, financial reporting quality is associated 
with better access to trade credit capital. Consequently, the financial reporting quality of 
private firms does have economic consequences even in the presence of private 
communication channels that serve as alternative information asymmetry- mitigating 
mechanisms.  
The quality of financial statement verification is a fundamental determinant of 
financial reporting quality. In audit research, the size of the auditor has been frequently 
used as a surrogate measure for audit quality. The positive link between auditor size and 
audit quality, however, rests on the assumption of strong large- auditor incentives to 
deliver superior quality as a result of reputation, litigation, and regulatory scrutiny 
considerations. In the absence of such incentives, the relation between auditor size and 
audit quality becomes less obvious. This observation gains particular importance in the 
presence of strong incentives by small auditors to maintain a sufficient level of high audit 
quality as well in light of arguments suggesting that non- Big 4 auditors have better 
knowledge of their clients compared to Big 4 auditors. Such small- auditor audit quality 
advantages might not be able to materialize in the presence of strong Big 4 incentives to 
retain their audit quality advantage. However, when these incentives become materially 
weak, the manifestation of a non- Big 4 audit quality advantage becomes more likely. In 
chapter 3, I investigate the interplay between auditor size and audit quality in the UK 
private firm setting. Auditor litigation and reputation considerations are significantly 
weaker in private firm settings. Furthermore, the UK is characterized by low alignment 
between financial and tax reporting. As a result, auditors are less likely to be scrutinized by 
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tax authorities. This further reduces auditor incentives to deliver high quality audits. The 
UK private firm setting therefore qualifies as a setting in which large auditors have 
reduced incentives to offer high quality audits. Using a sample of UK private firm auditees 
that spans from 2005 to 2012, I find that clients of non- Big 4 auditors are associated with 
better audit quality compared to clients of Big 4 auditors. Results are robust to a battery of 
alternative specifications and indicate that, in the absence of strong large- auditor 
incentives to deliver high quality audits, the otherwise positive relation between auditor 
size and audit quality reverses. Chapter 3 contributes to the literature primarily by being 
the first to document the existence of a negative relation between auditor size and audit 
quality in the private firm setting when large auditors has materially weak incentives to 
deliver high quality audits. It additionally contributes to audit research by assessing the 
importance of auditor incentives over competing explanations in shaping the Big 4 audit 
quality advantage that typically characterizes public firm settings. 
In chapter 4, I investigate a relatively unexplored determinant of audit quality: the 
level of auditor political connectedness. Accounting research seems to conclude that 
politically connected firms are associated with lower financial reporting quality as a result 
of their ability to capture regulators and enforcement agencies. The purpose of chapter 4 is 
to investigate the relation between auditor political connections and audit quality at the 
audit office level. Using a sample of long- term Big 4 audit employee PAC contributions to 
members of committees responsible for auditor regulation and oversight that spans from 
2003 to 2012, I find that clients of political connected offices are less likely to restate their 
earnings. However, in contrast to the firm- specific results, I report no evidence of 
regulatory capture by auditors. I argue that politically connected auditors have increased 
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reputation considerations and superior standard setting and audit- relevant knowledge as a 
result of their network connections and position. Results further indicate that the negative 
relation between audit office political connectedness and client restatement frequency does 
not persist for politically connected clients. This finding suggests that politically connected 
auditors are less likely to deliver high quality audits for those clients for which the 
likelihood that an audit failure is detected is lower. Chapter 4 contributes to the literature 
by being the first to investigate the relation between auditor political connections and audit 
quality at the office level. It demonstrates that the political connections of auditors accrue 
audit quality benefits to their clients and, as such, auditor- and firm- specific political 
connections affect accounting quality in opposite directions. It additionally contributes to 
the audit literature by recognizing audit office political connectedness as a potential threat 
to auditor independence but only for those clients that are politically connected 
themselves.   
1.2 Declaration of Contribution 
In this section, I declare my contribution to the three studies of this dissertation and 
acknowledge the contribution of other parties where relevant.  
Chapter 2: This chapter is based on Elemes and Peek (2015). A significant part of 
this paper has been completed by the author under the guidance of the co-author. 
Chapter 3: This chapter has been completed independently by the author. The 
feedback of the supervisor has been implemented. 
Chapter 4: This chapter has been completed independently by the author. The 
feedback of the supervisor has been implemented. 
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Chapter 2

 
 
The Economic Consequences of Private Firms’ Financial Reporting 
Quality 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Bank and trade credit financing are the two primary sources of external capital for 
private firms (Berger and Udell 1998)1. Nevertheless, empirical evidence on the 
association between financial reporting quality and private firms’ access to debt and trade 
credit financing is scarce. Prior research has primarily focused on the financial reporting 
differences between public and private firms (Ball and Shivakumar 2005; Burgstahler et al. 
2006; Peek et al. 2010; Hope et al. 2013), the effect of auditing on private firms’ cost of 
debt and access to external financing (Allee and Yohn 2009; Hope et al. 2011; Minnis 
2011; Kim et al. 2011; Karjalainen 2011; Koren et al. 2014) or on the relation between 
financial reporting quality and the cost of debt for the private debt of publicly listed 
companies (Bharath et al. 2008; Wittenberg-Moerman 2008; Callahan et al. 2014). There 
is a recent exception, Vander Bauwhede et al. (2015), who investigate the relation between 
financial reporting quality and the cost of debt for private firms. However, their study 
merely focuses on the cost of debt rather than overall access to private firms’ most 
important forms of capital and is additionally restricted to the Belgian private firm setting 
only. 
                                                            
 This chapter is based on Elemes and Peek (2015). I thank Urska Kosi, Ann Vanstraelen, workshop participants 
at Erasmus University Rotterdam, Humboldt University, and the 2014 AAA IAS Midyear Meeting. 
1 Consistent with this argument, I report mean (median) bank debt to total assets and trade payables to total assets 
ratios of 25.82% (24.22%) and 20.80% (19.86%) respectively using a sample of private firms from the European 
Union’s five largest economies. 
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 The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between attributes of 
accounting earnings and private firms’ access to debt and trade credit capital. To this end, I 
use a sample of private firms from the European Union’s five largest economies, i.e., the 
United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, which spans from 1997 to 2010. 
Because my primary objective is to investigate the impact of accounting choices (rather 
than economic factors) on the financing decisions of private firms, I focus on accrual-
based earnings attributes. The earnings attributes that I consider are accrual quality and 
accrual informativeness. Accrual quality captures the precision with which accruals map 
on past, present, and future cash flows, whereas accrual informativeness measures the 
ability of accruals to predict future cash flow changes. To my knowledge, this is one of the 
first papers to investigate the relation between the financial reporting choices of private 
firms and their access to their foremost sources of financing, namely bank debt and trade 
credit capital.  
According to the European Commission more than 99% of all European businesses 
are private firms. They provide two out of three of the private sector jobs and contribute to 
more than half of the total value-added created by businesses in the EU. Yet private firms’ 
financial reporting choices have received disproportionally low attention in accounting 
research. This seems to be partly due to the consensus in accounting research that private 
firms have weaker incentives for high-quality reporting than public firms. Cloyd et al. 
(1996), Ball and Shivakumar (2005), and Burgstahler et al. (2006) argue that tax, dividend, 
and compensation considerations are some of the main drivers of private firms’ financial 
reporting quality. Furthermore, private firms are characterized by different ownership, 
governance, and financing structures compared to public firms (Ball and Shivakumar 
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2005; Burgstahler et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2011; Hope et al. 2013). Public firms’ creditors 
are typically at arm’s length from the firms to which they provide financing. Instead, 
private firms’ suppliers and capital providers develop private communication channels 
with their customers and therefore rely less on financial statements to mitigate information 
asymmetry (Petersen and Rajan 1997; Boot 2000).  
Potential capital providers, however, do not enjoy the information acquisition 
benefits of existing financiers. Instead, they are characterized by severe information 
asymmetry problems, primarily in the form of adverse selection. This latter observation is 
important for private firms since they gradually become informationally captured by their 
relationship lenders. In particular, the relationship lending literature establishes a link 
between financial reporting opacity and higher-than-competitive interest rates (Sharpe 
1990; Boot 2000). Furthermore, the customer base of trade credit suppliers is typically 
more risky compared to that of banks. Suppliers are therefore severely exposed to default 
risk (Ng et al. 1999) and often require that buyers take actions to establish creditworthiness 
prior to the provision of credit (Fisman and Raturi 2004; Ng et al. 1999). I therefore expect 
accounting quality to play an important role in the customer screening process of both 
banks and suppliers. 
The results of the empirical analysis confirm the existence of a link between the 
financial reporting quality of private firms and their cost of debt. The regressions of the 
cost of debt on accrual quality show that, the cost of debt difference between the worst and 
best accrual quality deciles amounts to up to 37 basis points. The corresponding difference 
between the worst and best accrual informativeness deciles is roughly 9 basis points. 
Furthermore, both accrual quality and accrual informativeness are associated with lower 
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levels of short to total debt. In particular, the difference between the worst and best deciles 
amount to up to 1.94 and 2.35 percentage points for the corresponding measure. These 
findings suggest that financial reporting quality is priced by private firms’ debt capital 
providers. Furthermore, high quality financial reporting allows private firms gain better 
access to long- term financing and therefore rely less on short- term debt, which is 
relatively more expensive. Financial reporting quality therefore also affects private firms’ 
debt structure decisions. 
 In a second step, I investigate the link between high quality financial reporting and 
access to trade credit capital. The respective analysis shows that both earnings attributes 
are positively associated with access to trade credit. The difference between the worst and 
best accrual quality deciles amounts to up to 1.5 percentage points, whereas the difference 
between the worst and best accrual informativeness deciles amounts to up to 1.26 
percentage points.  Therefore, the accounting choices of private firms determine the 
financing decision of not merely debt providers, but trade credit providers as well. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, it offers insight into the 
financial reporting incentives of private firms. To a large extent, prior research has either 
investigated the accounting quality of private firms in comparison to that of public firms or 
has focused on the implications of auditing on private firms’ cost of debt. My finding that 
high quality financial reporting has economic implications for private firms illustrates that 
private firms have incentives to adopt transparent financial reporting practices.    
Second, to my knowledge, this is the first paper to examine the association between 
financial reporting quality and private firms’ access to trade credit capital. Trade credit 
constitutes the second most importance source of capital for private firms (Berger and 
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Udell 1998). I show that private firms with high quality financial reporting gain better 
access to trade credit financing.  
Finally, this paper is also relevant in light of the voluntary adoption of IFRS for 
SMEs in the European Union. In July 2009 the IASB published an International Financial 
Reporting Standard (IFRS) designed for use by small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SMEs), the adoption of which is currently voluntary in the EU. By providing evidence of 
the favorable market outcomes that are associated with high quality financial reporting, 
this paper is relevant to policymakers who actively seek ways to improve accounting 
standards and customize them to the financial reporting needs of private firms and their 
stakeholders. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review the 
related literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the earnings attributes and 
the empirical models used.  In section 4, I describe the sample selection process and offer 
descriptive statistics, as well as the correlations among the earnings attributes. Empirical 
tests and results are presented in section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
2.2 Background and Hypothesis Development 
The consensus in the accounting literature seems to be that private firms exhibit 
lower levels of financial reporting quality than public firms. This idea has been confirmed 
in many studies using different properties of accounting earnings. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) and Peek et al. (2010), for example, focus on timely loss recognition and report that 
private firms exhibit lower levels of conditional conservatism than public firms. 
Burgstahler et al. (2006) employ various proxies of earnings management, such as earnings 
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smoothness and the magnitude of total accruals, and conclude that European private firms 
are more likely to engage in earnings management. More recently, Hope et al. (2013) find 
that US public firms have higher accrual quality and are more conservative compared to 
private firms. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) support the view that the financial reporting 
quality of private firms is primarily driven by tax, dividend and compensation payment 
policies. In line with this argument, Cloyd et al. (1996) and Burgstahler et al. (2006) find 
that tax considerations play an important role in determining private firms’ financial 
reporting decisions. 
Private firms have weak incentives to communicate their true economic 
performance through public financial reports due to lower market demand. They typically 
have more concentrated ownership structures compared to public firms and are 
characterized by greater shareholder involvement in the management of the firm (Hope et 
al. 2012). These factors result in lower shareholder- management conflicts (La Porta et al. 
1999). Moreover, private firms tend to make more use of relationship lending and trade 
credit financing. Whereas, public firms’ shareholders and creditors are more at arm’s 
length from management, private stakeholders use private communication channels to 
acquire information about firms’ true economic performance. Private communication 
channels strongly characterize both bank lending and trade credit financing in the private 
firm setting.  
Bank lending in private firms typically takes the form of relationship banking. Boot 
(2000) argues that relationship banking resolves problems of asymmetric information and 
provides capital to firms whose informational opacity hinders their ability to obtain 
financing. However, relationship banking is also associated with significant hold- up costs 
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as firms gradually become informationally captured by banks (Rajan 1992; Sharpe 1990). 
Firms’ reporting opacity gives relationship banks an informational advantage over outside 
creditors thus allowing banks to extract rents to the detriment of their borrowers. In other 
words, financial reporting opacity increases information asymmetry among existing and 
potential providers of bank capital. As a result, outside lenders are unable to determine 
potential borrowers’ true repayment ability and command high interest rates to compensate 
themselves for the incurred uncertainty. Existing lenders who have inside information 
about their clients’ creditworthiness are therefore able to charge interest rates that are still 
higher than what their borrowers’ true level of riskiness would justify.  This creates 
incentives for private firms to improve financial reporting quality as a means of mitigating 
information asymmetry and the associated hold- up problems. 
In the current paper, I focus on the following earnings attributes: accrual quality and 
accrual informativeness. My estimate of accrual quality is the precision with which 
working capital accruals map into past, present, and future cash flows of operations 
(Dechow and Dichev 2002; McNichols 2002). Cash flow from operations represent the 
valuation- relevant construct that earnings are intended to capture. Consequently, 
intentional and unintentional errors incur uncertainty about the distribution of future cash 
flows. I therefore expect that low levels of accrual quality impair the ability of lenders to 
assess borrowers’ repayment capacity. Accrual informativeness captures the extent to 
which accruals predict future cash flow changes.  In this context, accrual informativeness 
is a useful measure for capital providers because it improves their ability to estimate the 
future cash flows of their customers. Taken together, I consider favorable values of each of 
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these measures to alleviate the information asymmetry that exists between private firms 
and their potential lenders.   
To the degree that high quality financial reporting shape debt providers’ lending 
decisions, I expect that there is a direct link between the two earnings attributes and private 
firm’s cost of debt. I additionally expect the accounting choices of private firms to 
determine their debt structure decisions by allowing them to gain more access to long- 
term debt compared to short- term debt, which is relatively more expensive. Following this 
analysis, I formulate my first two hypotheses as follows: 
H1a: Financial reporting quality is negatively associated with private firms’ 
cost of debt. 
H1b: Financial reporting quality is negatively associated with private firms’ 
short to total debt ratios. 
Like banks, suppliers also rely heavily on private communication channels to 
extract information about their customers’ creditworthiness. Petersen and Rajan (1997) 
express the view that suppliers have an information advantage in inferring customer 
financial strength. They argue that suppliers are able to visit buyers’ premises more often 
than financial institutions. In addition, suppliers use early payment discounts (two- part 
payment terms) that mitigate information asymmetry problems between the two parties 
(Smith 1987; Pike et al. 2005; Petersen and Rajan 1997; Ng et al. 1999). Petersen and 
Rajan (1997) add that early payment discounts serve as trip wires alerting suppliers of a 
potential deterioration of their clients’ creditworthiness. They explain that failure to claim 
12
 
 
the generous discount that is implied in the two- part payment terms provides a strong 
signal that the customer may be facing financial difficulties.  
On the other hand, suppliers can have a risky base of customers. This argument is 
consistent with the price discrimination theory which predicts that trade credit is 
overpriced for creditworthy customers, yet constitutes an attractive source of financing for 
less creditworthy customers (Petersen and Rajan 1997; Ng et al. 1999; Pike et al. 2005)2. 
Trade credit therefore exposes the seller to default risk (Ng et al. 1999). This enhances the 
incentives that suppliers have to use financial statements in order to infer customer 
creditworthiness. Although providers of trade credit can cut off the supply and seize the 
products for which credit has been granted if the buyer defaults, they have strong reasons 
to extend the credit terms and avoid termination of their business relationship. This is 
especially true when suppliers make non- salvageable investments on customers, such as 
the development of buyer- specific equipment or investments in salespersons who develop 
specific knowledge about buyers’ operations (Smith 1987). Suppliers therefore have an 
implicit equity stake in the firm equal to the present value of the margins they make on 
current and future sales of their products. Petersen and Rajan (1997) argue that this equity 
stake may far exceed the implicit equity stake of financial institutions because of the 
potential for future business.  
Furthermore, the trade credit literature appears to support the argument that buyers 
may need to exert effort to establish creditworthiness prior to the provision of trade credit. 
                                                            
2 Petersen and Rajan (1997) provide three main reasons to explain why suppliers offer trade credit to financially 
constrained buyers. First, compared to financial institutions, suppliers are better able to force repayment by 
threatening to cut- off supply. Alternatively, they can repossess and sell the products against which credit has 
been granted if the buyer is unable to meet his financial obligations. Second, suppliers often invest in 
relationships with currently unprofitable but growing firms in anticipation of capturing future business. Finally, 
they are often able to acquire the information they need at low cost from other market participants, e.g., other 
suppliers. 
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This may take the form of either industry- specific sunk investments (Ng et al. 1999) or 
up- front relationship- specific investments (Fisman and Raturi 2004). In particular, 
Fisman and Raturi (2004) argue that prior to the provision of credit sellers may request that 
buyers take actions to increase the transparency of their accounts and operations. 
Examining a potential customer’s financial statements helps suppliers evaluate the firm’s 
future cash flows, make inferences about its riskiness and determine whether investing in a 
long- term relationship is viable. From this perspective, financial reporting transparency 
would allow sellers to evaluate customer financial strength and accurately estimate the 
distribution of future cash flows.  
Based on these arguments, I formulate the next hypothesis as follows: 
H2: Financial reporting quality is positively associated with private firms’ 
access to trade credit capital. 
2.3 Methodology 
2.3.1 Earnings Attributes 
2.3.1.1 Accrual Quality 
My proxy of accrual quality is the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure, as modified 
by McNichols (2002), which captures the extent to which working capital accruals map on 
past, present, and future CFO: 
𝑾𝑪𝑨𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜶𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜶𝟐𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜶𝟒𝚫𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟓𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕 +
𝜺𝒊,𝒕 (𝟏),   
where: 
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𝐖𝐂𝐀𝐢,𝐭:  The working capital accruals of firm i in year t, calculated as change in current 
assets less change in current liabilities less change in cash plus change in short- term debt 
(𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = Δ𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝐶𝐿𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ). 
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕: The cash flow from operations of firm i in year t calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items less total accruals, where total accruals equal working capital accruals 
less depreciation (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑖,𝑡). 
𝚫𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕: The change in revenue of firm i in year t relative to year t-1.  
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕: The property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t. 
𝜺𝒊,𝒕: The error term. 
I scale all variables by lagged total assets and winsorize them at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Following Francis et al. (2005), I estimate equation (1) for each of the Fama and 
French's (1997) 48 industry groups with at least 20 firms in year t. The industry-year 
estimates from these regressions allow us to calculate firm and year- specific residuals. My 
firm and year- specific accrual quality measure is the 5-year standard deviation of the 
residuals estimated in the previous step, multiplied by -1, so that higher values indicate 
better accrual quality: 
Accrual Quality: −𝒔𝒕𝒅𝒕−𝟒,𝒕𝜺𝒊,𝒕 
2.3.1.2 Accrual Informativeness 
My measure of accrual informativeness is the beta coefficient of the regression of 
cash flow changes on lagged total accruals. The purpose of this measure is to capture the 
ability of accruals to predict future cash flow changes.  
𝜟𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝜟𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕+𝟏  (𝟐)  
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where: 
𝜟𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕+𝟏: The cash flow from operations of firm i in year t+1 minus the cash flow from 
operations of firm i in year t. 
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕: The total accruals of firm i in year t. 
𝜺𝜟𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕+𝟏: The error term. 
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets and winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Due to the lack of sufficient time- series data to produce unbiased firm- specific 
OLS estimates, I employ a random coefficient model (RCM) and estimate regression (2) at 
the firm-year level using 5- year rolling windows. My accrual informativeness measure is 
the firm- year specific beta coefficients of these regressions: 
Accrual Informativeness: 𝜷𝟏 
2.3.2 Empirical Specifications 
I now discuss the models used to test the hypotheses and provide definitions for the 
control variables used. In order to test Hypothesis 1a, I regress the cost of debt on each of 
the 2 earnings attributes separately. Instead of using the raw values of the earnings 
attributes, I follow Francis et al. (2004) and rank each attribute in deciles. The use of 
deciles allows us to better compare coefficient estimates across attributes and control for 
the existence of outliers and non- linearities. I additionally control for a number of 
variables that have been identified in prior research to determine the cost of debt (Francis 
et al. 2005; Minnis 2011; Karjalainen 2011). The controls that I use are firm size, return on 
assets, leverage, current ratio, earnings volatility, debt maturity, asset tangibility, Altman’s 
Z-score, and firm age: 
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𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕 = 𝝋𝟎 + 𝝋𝟏𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝋𝟐𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝐢,𝐭 + 𝛗𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝋𝟒𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 +
𝛗𝟓𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝋𝟔𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛗𝟕𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊,𝒕 +
𝛗𝟖𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛗𝟗𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊,𝒕 + 𝝋𝟏𝟎𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕 (𝟑),  
where: 
𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕 𝒐𝒇 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕: The ratio of interest expense of firm i in year t to the average interest- 
bearing debt (short and long- term debt) in years t and t-1.  
𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒕 : The decile rank of the corresponding earnings attribute (accrual quality or 
accrual informativeness) of firm i in year t. Higher decile ranks correspond to more 
favorable earnings attribute values. 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕: The natural logarithm of total assets (in euros) of firm i in year t. 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕: The ratio of net income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t to total assets 
in year t-1.  
𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊.𝒕 : The ratio of interest- bearing debt (short and long- term debt) of firm i in 
year t to total assets in year t-1. 
𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕: The ratio of current assets to current liabilities of firm i in year t. 
𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕: The Z-score of firm i in year t calculated as 1.2*(Net Working Capital/Total 
Assets)+ 1.4*(Retained Earnings/Total Assets)+3.3*(EBIT/Total Assets)+ 0.6* (Book 
Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities)+ Operating Revenue/Total Assets.  
𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊,𝒕: The 5-year (from year t-4 to year t) standard deviation of net 
income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t divided by the average total assets 
during the same period. 
𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕: The ratio of short- term debt to total debt of firm i in year t. 
𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊,𝒕: The ratio PPE of firm i in year t to total assets in year t-1. 
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𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕: The age in years of firm i in year t. 
𝜺𝑪𝒐𝒔𝒕𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕: The error term. 
 
Furthermore, to test Hypothesis 1b, I regress the level of short to total debt on each 
earnings attribute after controlling for size, return on assets, leverage, current ratio, 
Altman’s Z- Score, earnings volatility, asset tangibility, and firm age. In particular, I 
perform the following regression:  
𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕𝒊,𝒕
= 𝜸𝟎 + 𝜸𝟏𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜸𝟐𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛄𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛄𝟒𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝛄𝟓𝑪𝒖𝒓𝒓𝒆𝒓𝒏𝒕 𝑹𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒐𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜸𝟔𝒁𝒔𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝛄𝟕𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝛄𝟖𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜸𝟗𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝑺𝒉𝒐𝒓𝒕 𝒕𝒐 𝑻𝒐𝒕𝒂𝒍 𝑫𝒆𝒃𝒕 (𝟒) 
Variables are defined as previously. 
 
Finally, to test Hypothesis 2, I regress trade credit on each of the 2 earnings 
attributes separately while controlling for firm size, return on assets, leverage, change in 
sales, earnings volatility, and firm age (Petersen and Rajan 1997). I also control for the 
degree of asset tangibility because I expect that firms with higher levels of tangible assets 
are less likely to use trade credit capital. Tangible assets can serve as collateral and they 
therefore facilitate debt financing. It follows that, in the presence of significant levels of 
tangible assets, firms are more likely to opt for bank debt instead trade credit capital 
because bank debt is a cheaper source of financing.  
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜽𝟎 + 𝜽𝟏𝑨𝒕𝒕𝒓𝒊𝒃𝒖𝒕𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜽𝟐𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜽𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜽𝟒𝑳𝒆𝒗𝒆𝒓𝒂𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝜽𝟓𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜽𝟔𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒔 𝑽𝒐𝒍𝒂𝒕𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚
+ 𝜽𝟕𝑻𝒂𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒃𝒊𝒍𝒊𝒕𝒚𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜽𝟖𝑨𝒈𝒆𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊,𝒕(𝟓), 
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where: 
𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊,𝒕: The ratio of trade payables of firm i in year t to total assets in year t-1. 
𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔 𝑮𝒓𝒐𝒘𝒕𝒉𝒊,𝒕: The change in revenue of firm i in year t relative to year t-1 divided by 
total assets in year t-1. 
𝜺𝑻𝒓𝒂𝒅𝒆 𝑪𝒓𝒆𝒅𝒊𝒕𝒊,𝒕: The error term. 
I winsorize all non- logarithmic variables of regressions (3), (4), and (5) at the 1% 
and 99% levels. Moreover, I perform regressions (3), (4), and (5) with and without the 
inclusion of industry, year, and country fixed effects. 
2.4 Data 
2.4.1 Sample Selection 
My source of financial data is the Amadeus database supplied by Bureau van Dijk. 
Amadeus provides financial statement data for approximately 19 million public and private 
companies with audited financial accounts from 34 European countries. Financial data for 
firms within Amadeus is retained for a rolling period of 10 years. When a new year of data 
is added, the oldest year is dropped. This means that only the most recent data for each 
company is available. In order to overcome this restriction and create a longer time- series 
of data I merge the online version of Amadeus with older offline versions (updates). In 
particular, I merge twelve (12) past Amadeus updates issued between 1999 and 2010 with 
the July 2013 online version of the database. 
The initial sample consists of all private firms that have their domicile in the 
European Union’s 5 largest economies, namely Germany, the United Kingdom, France, 
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Italy, and Spain. I subsequently adopt size restrictions consistent with the 4th EU directive. 
That is, I require that at least 2 of the following criteria are met in at least one year: a) total 
assets greater than or equal to EUR 2.5 million, b) sales greater than or equal to EUR 5 
million, and c) number of employees greater than or equal to 50. By adopting size criteria 
consistent with the 4th EU directive, I explicitly exclude small private firms for which 
certain reporting requirement may not fully apply (Burgstahler et al. 2006). I remove 
financials (one- digit SIC code 6) and public institutions (one- digit SIC code 9), as well as 
firms with no industry classification in any of the fiscal years for which data is available. I 
also exclude firms that are subsidiaries of quoted companies because investment, 
financing, and operating decisions of these subsidiaries could be influenced by parent 
companies and therefore bias my results (Burgstahler et al. 2006; Peek et al. 2010). 
Finally, I remove all firm-years in which the fiscal year is not exactly 12 months as well as 
identification number and fiscal year duplicates requiring that only those observations with 
the smallest number of missing values in key variables are retained. 
In line with the findings of prior literature (Pittman and Fortin 2004; Francis et al. 
2005; Minnis 2011), I find that my cost of debt measure contains significant noise. The 
noise persists even after truncating the variable at the 5th and 95th percentile. I therefore 
follow Minnis (2011) and further truncate the variable so that the cost of debt falls within 
10% of the risk- free rate3.  My final sample consists of 40,127 firms and 115,652 firm- 
year observations and covers the period 1997-2010. For every firm that ends up in my final 
sample, I require at least 8 years of consecutive and complete data4. 
                                                            
3 I use the 10-year government bond as my yearly risk- free rate measure. I obtain this data from Datastream. 
4 This requirement allows us to use a balanced sample for my analyses as well as compute all relevant standard 
deviations using 5 years of data. 
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 Table 2.1, Panel A, presents the distribution of the number of firms per fiscal year 
for the sample period 1997-2010. The increase in the number of firms over time 
demonstrates the gradual improvement in the coverage of the database. Panel B shows the 
allocation of firms and firm- year observations per country. Germany is less represented 
compared to the other four countries. This is primarily due to the insufficient coverage of 
large German firms by Amadeus5. 
 
                                                            
5 In its manual, Amadeus acknowledges that the coverage of German firms is insufficient due to gaps in the 
reports and the fact that many large German firms do not file their reports. 
Fiscal Year
1997 3,715
1998 4,268
1999 3,337
2000 4,935
2001 5,744
2002 6,793
2003 6,978
2004 7,685
2005 8,663
2006 9,174
2007 9,038
2008 13,436
2009 15,792
2010 16,094
Country
Germany 988 2,061
UK 4,215 12,744
Italy 18,781 52,309
Spain 9,928 34,728
France 6,215 13,810
Sum 40,127 115,652
Panel B: Number of Firms\ Firm- Year Observations per Country
Number of Observations
Panel A presents the distribution of the final sample per fiscal year. Panel B presents
the number of firms per country in the final sample, as well as the number of firm- year
observations
Number of Firms
TABLE 2.1
Panel A: Number of Observations per Fiscal Year
Number of Observations
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2.4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the final sample. The mean (median) 
firm has € 19.31 (€ 8.64) million in total assets and € 23.11 (€ 11.33) million in revenue.  I 
report mean (median) values of debt and trade credit as a percentage of lagged total assets 
of 25.82% (24.22%) and 20.80% (19.86%) respectively. These figures indicate that bank 
debt and trade credit constitute significant sources of financing for private firms.  
Furthermore, the mean (median) cost of debt amount to 6.58% (6.02%). On average, 
profitability as a percentage of lagged total assets amounts to 2.16% and PPE as a 
percentage of lagged total  assets amount to  roughly 25.02%. This latter ratio measures the 
 
Variables N Mean St. Dev. 25% Median 75%
Cost of Debt 115,652 6.5820 3.0040 4.3080 6.0180 8.3510
Trade Credit 115,652 20.8000 11.5800 11.8700 19.8600 28.5800
Short to Total Debt 115,652 65.5800 32.3700 40.5000 72.5800 99.4900
Accrual Quality 115,652 -0.0304 0.0182 -0.0389 -0.0263 -0.0174
Accrual Informativeness 115,652 1.1196 0.0980 1.0737 1.1164 1.1603
Leverage 115,652 25.8200 16.9000 11.5900 24.2200 38.0600
Size 115,652 16.1300 0.9910 15.4000 15.9700 16.6700
ROA 115,652 2.1600 4.9080 0.0046 1.4030 4.3560
Current Ratio 115,652 1.5420 0.8720 1.0580 1.2950 1.7290
Z- Score 115,652 2.9370 1.2340 2.0640 2.7400 3.5900
Earnings Volatility 115,652 0.0261 0.0234 0.0105 0.0192 0.0336
Sales Growth 115,652 2.5340 25.0900 -8.5990 2.6740 14.2000
Tangibility 115,652 25.0200 20.1700 8.9540 20.5000 36.0600
Age 115,652 29.3200 15.7700 19.0000 26.0000 36.0000
Total Assets (in million €) 115,652 19.3100 35.8400 4.8650 8.6360 17.3300
Revenue (in million €) 115,652 23.1100 38.9700 6.7090 11.3300 21.6300
TABLE 2.2
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for all firm- year observations of the final sample.
The cost of debt is restricted so that it ranges within 10% of the risk- free rate. All other
non- logarithmic variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Variables
Cost of Debt, Trade Credit, Short to Total Debt, Leverage, ROA, Sales Growth, and
Tangibility have been multiplied by 100. See Appendix for variable definitions.
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degree to which assets can be pledged as security for a debt under the scenario that the 
borrower reneges on his financial obligations. Finally, the mean (median) firm age is 29 
years (26 years). 
2.4.3 Correlations 
Table 2.3 presents the pairwise Pearson correlations for all variables. The table 
shows that accrual quality is positively correlated with accrual informativeness. The 
corresponding correlation coefficient amounts to 0.209 and is statistically significant at the 
1% level. Furthermore, accrual quality is negatively associated with the cost of debt (-
0.0425) and positively associated with the level of trade credit (0.0627). Both correlation 
coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level. These correlations provide some 
initial evidence that private firm providers of debt financing as well as trade credit view 
accrual quality as a favorable earnings attribute. Table 2.3 additionally shows that accrual 
informativeness is positively associated with the level of trade credit (0.0471) but 
positively associated with the cost of debt as well (0.0503). Again, the corresponding 
correlation coefficients are significant at the 1% level. The positive correlation between the 
ability of accruals to predict future cash flow changes and the cost of debt appears to 
contradict initial expectations. However, this analysis does not take into account the effect 
of control variables and therefore the use of multivariate specifications is necessary before 
drawing further inferences.  
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Cost of 
Debt
Trade 
Credit
Short to 
Total 
Debt
Accrual 
Quality
Accrual 
Informati-
veness
Leverage Size ROA
Current 
Ratio
Z- Score
Earnings 
Volatility
Sales 
Growth
Tangi-
bility
Age
Cost of Debt 1
Trade Credit 0.1558 1
Short to Total Debt 0.1363 0.2087 1
Accrual Quality -0.0425 0.0627 -0.0117 1
Accrual Inform. 0.0503 0.0471 0.0045 0.209 1
Leverage -0.1583 -0.156 0.031 -0.0031 -0.0852 1
Size -0.1109 -0.2389 -0.1353 0.1373 -0.0349 0.1192 1
ROA -0.0121 -0.0655 -0.0793 0.0539 0.0554 -0.3453 -0.003 1
Current Ratio -0.0431 -0.3428 -0.2313 -0.019 -0.0324 -0.3683 0.0449 0.2352 1
Z- Score 0.0381 -0.055 0.0446 0.0041 0.0445 -0.4762 -0.1998 0.481 0.4493 1
Earnings Volatility 0.0448 -0.1248 -0.0361 -0.5918 -0.0694 -0.1448 -0.1042 0.0415 0.1088 0.1007 1
Sales Growth 0.0422 0.1314 0.0126 0.0368 0.025 -0.0619 0.0493 0.2722 -0.0718 0.1578 -0.026 1
Tangibility -0.0975 -0.3764 -0.3379 0.046 0.035 0.102 0.2034 -0.014 -0.1821 -0.1514 0.0157 0.0228 1
Age -0.0029 -0.1466 -0.0222 0.0717 0.0225 -0.0785 0.1892 -0.032 0.0906 0.0234 0.0043 -0.0125 0.092 1
TABLE 2.3
This table presents pairwise Pearson correlations for all firm- year observations of the final sample. See Appendix A for variable definitions. For both 
Accrual Quality and Accrual Informativeness larger values indicate better financial reporting quality. Bold indicates significance at the two-tailed 1% level.
Correlation Matrix
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2.5 Results 
2.5.1 Cost of Debt 
Table 2.4 presents the results of the regressions of the cost of debt on each earnings 
attribute after controlling for a number of known determinants of the cost of debt. For each 
earnings attribute, two regressions are performed: one without fixed effects and one 
including industry, year, and country fixed effects. 
Consistent with expectations, accrual quality is negatively associated with the cost 
of debt and statistically significant at the 1% level in both specifications (with and without 
fixed effects). The average coefficient estimate of the regression that does not include 
fixed effects ( -0.0262) suggests a difference of roughly 24 basis points (9 deciles x 
0.0262) in the cost of debt between the worst and the best accrual quality deciles. The 
effect is stronger in the specification that includes fixed effects (average coefficient 
estimate: -0.0406) and corresponds to a difference of approximately 37 basis points 
between the worst and best accrual quality deciles. The coefficient of accrual 
informativeness on the other hand, is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in 
the specification that does not include fixed effects. This finding seems to indicate that 
there is a positive relation between the ability of accruals to predict future cash flow 
changes and the cost of debt. However, the respective coefficient turns negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% level upon the inclusion of industry, year, and country 
fixed effects. Under this latter specification, the difference between the worst and best 
earnings informativeness deciles corresponds to a difference of roughly 9 basis points in 
the cost of debt.  
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Variables
Attribute -0.0262*** -0.0406*** 0.0528*** -0.0102***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.006)
Size -0.1855*** -0.1994*** -0.1877*** -0.2141***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.0260*** -0.0365*** -0.0277*** -0.0371***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.0364*** -0.0339*** -0.0351*** -0.0335***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Current Ratio -0.2873*** -0.1784*** -0.2734*** -0.1808***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Z- Score -0.0673*** -0.1255*** -0.0712*** -0.1234***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Earnings Volatility 1.8619*** -1.9179*** 3.9543*** 0.3428
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.472)
Short to Total Debt 0.0089*** 0.0017*** 0.8887*** 0.1712***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangibility -0.0077*** -0.0078*** -0.0082*** -0.0081***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.0016* -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0014
(0.069) (0.243) (0.240) (0.107)
Constant 10.8672*** 14.7558*** 10.4036*** 14.8015***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 115,652 115,652 115,652 115,652
R-squared 0.0620 0.2258 0.0641 0.2248
TABLE 2.4
Regressions of Cost of Debt on Earnings Attributes
This table presents the regressions of the cost of debt on each earnings attribute for the final
sample with and without industry, year, and country fixed effects. The regressions are
performed using robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Earnings attributes are
ranked in deciles. Higher decile ranks correspond to better financial reporting quality. The cost
of debt is limited to 10% over the risk- free rate. All remaining non- logarithmic variables have
been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Dependent Variable: Cost of Debt
Accrual Quality Accrual Informativeness
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In untabulated tests, I repeat the last two regressions of Table 2.4 using as my 
measure of accrual informativeness the 5- year standard deviation of the residuals of 
regression (2). I further multiply this measure by -1, so that greater values correspond to 
higher levels of accrual informativeness. In both specifications (with and without fixed 
effects), my alternative proxy of earnings informativeness is negatively associated with the 
cost of debt. In addition, the difference between the worst and best earnings 
informativeness deciles amounts to roughly 19 basis points. Overall, the findings of the 
above analysis indicate that debt providers consider accrual quality and accrual 
informativeness as favorable earnings attributes and take them into account when pricing 
debt. 
In all specifications, the coefficient estimate on leverage is negative as opposed to 
the predicted positive sign. Minnis (2011) uses private firm data and also reports negative 
coefficients on leverage in his cost of debt regressions. In order to investigate whether this 
is due to possible misclassification of debt components as liabilities or due to the 
mechanical relation between the cost of debt and leverage (the denominator of the former 
variable is used as the numerator for the latter variable), I introduce two alternative cost of 
debt and leverage measures. That is, I measure cost of debt as interest expense divided by 
average total liabilities and leverage as the ratio of total liabilities to average interest- 
bearing debt. I subsequently replace either one or both of the original variables with their 
alternative specifications and perform the regressions of table 2.4. In all regressions 
leverage has a positive sign, consistent with expectations6. 
 
                                                            
6 These results are robust to the exclusion of trade payables from total liabilities. 
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2.5.2 Short to Total Debt 
Table 2.5 presents the results of regression (4) which investigates Hypothesis 1b for 
both accrual quality and accrual informativeness. I argue that, to the extent that financial 
reporting quality has economic consequences for private firms, it should also affect their 
propensity to use long- term debt in place of short- term debt, since the latter is relatively 
more expensive. Table 2.5 shows that results are consistent with this hypothesis. In 
particular, accrual quality is negatively associated with the level of short to total debt in the 
specification that does not include industry, year, and country fixed effects. The estimated 
coefficient is equal to -0.1344 and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This value 
indicates a difference of roughly 1.21 percentage points in the level of short to total debt 
between the worst and best accrual quality deciles. Furthermore, in the specification that 
includes industry, year, and country fixed effects, the negative relation between accrual 
quality and short to total debt persists and remains highly statistically significant (at the 1% 
level).  The estimated coefficient is equal to -0.2106 and corresponds to a difference of 
roughly 1.9 percentage points between the worst and best accrual quality deciles. 
The last two columns of Table 2.5 present the results of the regressions of short to 
total debt on accrual informativeness and controls. This analysis shows that, in the 
specification that does not include industry, year, and country fixed effects, the estimated 
coefficient on accrual informativeness is positive and insignificant. However, upon 
inclusion of industry, year, and country fixed effects, the related coefficient becomes 
negative and highly statistically significant (at the 1% level). In particular, the estimated 
coefficient is equal to -0.2616 and corresponds to a difference of 2.38 percentage points 
between  the worst and  best accrual informativeness  deciles. In untabulated tests,  I repeat 
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Variables
Attribute -0.1344*** -0.2106*** 0.0443 -0.2616***
(0.006) (0.000) (0.277) (0.000)
Size -0.3486** -0.5732*** -0.3822** -0.6747***
(0.035) (0.000) (0.020) (0.000)
ROA -0.5905*** -0.5688*** -0.5938*** -0.5692***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.0053 -0.0054 -0.0030 -0.0067
(0.567) (0.556) (0.749) (0.471)
Current Ratio -13.6953*** -12.8429*** -13.6791*** -12.8884***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Z- Score 5.0651*** 6.1826*** 5.0555*** 6.2016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Earnings Volatility -18.3262*** -15.7870*** -9.8441* -6.4956
(0.002) (0.006) (0.068) (0.215)
Tangibility -0.6063*** -0.5151*** -0.6075*** -0.5154***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age 0.0849*** 0.0655*** 0.0832*** 0.0644***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 92.7554*** 92.1594*** 92.1220*** 94.3711***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 115,652 115,652 115,652 115,652
R-squared 0.2298 0.2893 0.2297 0.2896
This table presents the regressions of the short to total debt ratio on each earnings attribute for 
the final sample with and without industry, year, and country fixed effects. The regressions are
performed using robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Earnings attributes are
ranked in deciles. Higher decile ranks correspond to better financial reporting quality. The cost
of debt is limited to 10% over the risk- free rate. All remaining non- logarithmic variables have
been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. See Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 2.5
Regressions of Short to Total Debt on Earnings Attributes
Dependent Variable: Short to Total Debt
Accrual Quality Accrual Informativeness
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the last two regressions of Table 2.5 using the alternative accrual informativeness measure 
of section 2.5.1, which is based on the negative 5-year standard deviation of the residuals 
of regression (2). In both specifications (with and without fixed effects), the estimated 
coefficients are negative and statistically significant at the 1% level indicating a difference 
between the worst and best accrual informativeness deciles of up to 3.06 percentage points. 
Overall, these findings suggest that higher values of both accrual quality and accrual 
informativeness are associated with better access to long- term debt and lower use of short- 
term debt. 
2.5.3 Trade Credit 
Table 2.6 presents the results of the regressions of trade credit on each earnings 
attribute after controlling for known determinants of trade credit. For each earnings 
attribute I provide again two alternative specifications: one without fixed effects and one 
including industry, year, and country fixed effects. 
The regressions of trade credit on accrual quality show that accrual quality is positively 
and significantly (at the 1% level) associated with trade credit in both specifications (with 
and without fixed effects). Its sign is therefore consistent with expectations. The average 
coefficient estimate on accrual quality amounts to 0.1622 for the regression that does not 
include fixed effects. This corresponds to a difference of 1.46 percentage points between 
the worst and best accrual quality deciles. The difference between the worst and best 
accrual quality deciles for the regression that includes fixed effects is 0.84 percentage 
points (0.067*9). Furthermore, accrual informativeness is positively associated with trade 
credit and highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) when no fixed effects are 
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included. The difference between the worst and best accrual informativeness deciles is 
1.26  percentage points.  The positive relation  between  accrual informativeness and  trade  
 
Variables
Attribute 0.1622*** 0.0670*** 0.1399*** 0.1137***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Size -1.8750*** -1.7598*** -1.8127*** -1.7215***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA -0.4293*** -0.3643*** -0.4285*** -0.3649***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Leverage -0.1255*** -0.1490*** -0.1252*** -0.1483***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sales Growth 0.0825*** 0.0713*** 0.0822*** 0.0714***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Earnings Volatility -64.7176*** -48.2722*** -72.9694*** -50.8326***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Tangibility -0.1850*** -0.1398*** -0.1851*** -0.1401***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age -0.0789*** -0.0724*** -0.0778*** -0.0721***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 62.7373*** 58.0108*** 62.0339*** 56.9930***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE No Yes No Yes
Industry FE No Yes No Yes
Country FE No Yes No Yes
Observations 115,652 115,652 115,652 115,652
R-squared 0.2577 0.3406 0.2577 0.3412
This table presents the regressions of trade credit on each earnings attribute for the final
sample with and without industry, year, and country fixed effects. The regressions are
performed using robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level. Earnings attributes are
ranked in deciles. Higher decile ranks correspond to better financial reporting quality. All
remaining non- logarithmic variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. See
Appendix for variable definitions. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
TABLE 2.6
Regressions of Trade Credit on Earnings Attributes
Dependent Variable: Trade Credit
Accrual Quality Accrual Informativeness
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credit persists and remains highly statistically significant at the  1% level when industry, 
year, and country fixed effects are included in the regression. In particular, the estimated 
coefficient amounts to 0.1137 which indicates a difference of 1.02 percentage points in the 
level of trade credit between the worst and best accrual informativeness deciles. 
2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, I investigate the link between the financial reporting quality of private 
firms and their financing decisions through two main venues: bank debt and trade credit. 
Private firms have been traditionally characterized by lower quality financial reporting 
compared to public firms. The argument is that, private firms have weaker incentives to 
communicate their true economic performance through the use of publicly available 
financial statements. To facilitate the exchange of relevant information with their 
stakeholders, private firms develop private communication channels, which in practice 
serve as alternative information asymmetry- mitigating mechanisms. In view of this 
argument, I ask the following questions: Does financial reporting quality matter for private 
firms? What are the benefits of preparing high quality financial reporting in the presence of 
private communication channels? 
To test this hypothesis, I consider two measures of financial reporting quality. 
These measures are accrual quality and accrual informativeness, which capture the 
precision with which accruals map on past, current, and future cash flow from operations, 
as well as the ability of accruals to predict future cash flow changes. I further examine the 
association of these earnings attributes with private firms’ access to bank debt and trade 
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credit capital. My sample includes private firms from the five largest economies of the 
European Union (U.K., Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) and spans from 1997 to 2010. 
The results show that both accrual quality and accrual informativeness are 
negatively associated with the cost of debt. Furthermore, higher levels of accrual quality 
and accrual informativeness are associated with lower levels of short to total debt. These 
findings suggest that debt providers consider accrual quality and accrual informativeness 
as favorable earnings attributes in the private firm market and incorporate them in the 
financing decisions. They additionally demonstrate that the accounting choices of private 
firms affect their debt structure decisions by allowing them to make more use of long- term 
debt relative to short- term debt. 
I further show that the accounting decisions of private firms also affect their access 
to trade credit financing. In particular, I provide evidence that higher levels of accrual 
quality and accrual informativeness are associated with higher levels of trade credit. 
Therefore, the financial reporting quality of private firms affects the financing decisions of 
not merely debt providers but trade credit providers as well. 
Based on these findings, I conclude that high quality financial reporting does have 
economic consequences even in the private firm setting where private communication 
channels serve as alternative information asymmetry- mitigating mechanisms. By 
highlighting the importance of financial reporting quality in the private firm market, the 
results of the current study are therefore directly relevant to the standard setters involved in 
the formulation of IFRS for SMEs. High quality financial reporting facilitates private 
firms’ access to their foremost means of financing, namely bank debt and trade credit 
capital. Consequently, accounting standards specifically designed for small and medium- 
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sized enterprises need to actively promote financial reporting transparency despite the 
findings of prior literature that effectively downplay its importance in the private firm 
market. 
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Appendix A 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
Cost of Debt The ratio of interest expense to the average 
interest- bearing debt (short and long- term debt) 
in the current and previous year. Following 
Minnis (2011), I initially truncate this variable at 
the 5th and 95th levels. I subsequently require 
that the cost of debt ranges within 10% of the 
corresponding 10- year government bond.  
Trade Credit  The ratio of trade payables to lagged total assets. 
I winsorize this variable at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
Short to Total Debt The ratio of short- term debt to total debt. I 
winsorize this variable at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
 
Panel B: Test Variables 
Accrual Quality The 5- year standard deviation of the of the 
modified by McNichols (2002), Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure, 
multiplied by -1. 
Accrual Informativeness  The beta coefficient of the regression of the 
change in cash flow from operations on lagged 
total accruals. 
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Attribute  The decile rank of the corresponding earnings 
attribute (accrual quality or accrual 
informativeness). For both earnings attributes, 
higher decile ranks correspond to more 
favorable earnings attribute values. 
 
Panel C: Control Variables 
Size The natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROA The ratio of net income before extraordinary 
items to lagged total assets. I winsorize this 
variable at the 1% and 99% levels.  
Leverage The ratio of interest- bearing debt (short and 
long- term debt) to lagged total assets. I 
winsorize this variable at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
Current Ratio The ratio of current assets to current liabilities. I 
winsorize this variable at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
Growth The change in sales relative to the previous 
fiscal year divided by lagged total assets. I 
winsorize this variable at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
Z- Score Altman’s Z- Score calculated as 1.2* (Net 
Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4* (Retained 
Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3* (EBIT/Total 
Assets) + 0.6* (Book Value of Equity/Book 
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Value of Total Liabilities) + Sales/Total Assets. 
I winsorize this variable at the 1% and 99% 
levels. 
Earnings Volatility The 5-year (from year t-4 to year t) standard 
deviation of net income before extraordinary 
items divided by the average total assets during 
the same period. I winsorize this variable at the 
1% and 99% levels. 
Tangibility The ratio PPE to lagged total assets. I winsorize 
this variable at the 1% and 99% levels. 
Age The age of the firm in years. I winsorize this 
variable at the 1% and 99% levels. 
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Chapter 3

 
 
Auditor Size and Audit Quality in a Private Firm and Low Book- Tax 
Conformity Setting: Is there a non- Big 4 Audit Quality Advantage? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Empirical research in auditing has repeatedly provided evidence of a positive 
relation between auditor size and audit quality using a variety of audit quality proxies  
(Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Kim et al. 2003; Lennox and Pittman 2010; Chan 
and Wu 2011). The Big 4 versus non- Big 4 differences in audit quality appear to be partly 
driven by incentives of large auditors to provide superior audit quality as a result of 
reputation, litigation, and regulatory scrutiny considerations (DeAngelo 1981; Francis and 
Wang 2008). Alternative determinants of the Big 4 audit quality advantage include the 
ability of large auditors to perform audits more efficiently for larger and more complex 
clients (Chaney et al. 2004), their limited dependence on individual clients (DeAngelo 
1981), as well as their ability to attract and retain high quality human capital (Dopuch and 
Simunic 1982). The positive relation between auditor size and audit quality, however, does 
not appear to hold under all settings. For example, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) 
argue that, in low auditor litigation and reputation risk environments, such as the ones that 
characterize private firms, large auditors constrain aggressive earnings management only in 
settings where financial statements are more likely to be scrutinized by tax authorities. 
This finding demonstrates the fundamental moderating role of auditor incentives in 
                                                          
 This chapter is based on Elemes (2015a). I thank Erik Peek, Padmakumar Sivadasan, Ann Vanstraelen, Ping 
Zhang, as well as workshop participants at the 2014 AAA Annual Meeting.   
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shaping the Big 4 versus non- Big 4 differences in audit quality. Yet, we still know very 
little regarding the interplay between auditor size and audit quality in the absence of strong 
auditor incentives for high quality audits.  
In this paper, I investigate the Big 4 versus non- Big 4 differences in audit quality in 
a setting where Big 4 auditors have significantly weakened incentives to deliver superior 
audit quality: the private firm environment of a low book- tax conformity country, i.e., the 
UK. Litigation and reputation costs are much lower for auditors in private firm settings 
(Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008; Hope and Langli 
2010). This is true even for countries that are characterized by robust legal institutions and 
strong legal enforcement, such as the UK (Chaney et al. 2004; Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen 2008). Furthermore, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) find that, in the 
private firm market, Big 4 auditors deliver superior audit quality only in high book- tax 
conformity settings where tax authorities are more likely to scrutinize financial statements. 
By focusing on the private firm client base of auditors in the UK, I provide a “natural 
laboratory” to test the relation between auditor size and audit quality under the base- case 
scenario where auditor reputation and litigation considerations are mitigated, while 
regulatory scrutiny by tax authorities is weak. Prior research focusing on the private firm 
market has only investigated the relation between auditor size and earnings management 
across Europe (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008). To my knowledge, this is the first 
paper to specifically study the interplay between auditor size and audit quality in a setting 
where large auditors have materially weak incentives to deliver superior audit quality and 
to employ a battery of distinct audit quality proxies for that purpose rather than a single 
aggregated earnings management measure as in Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) .  
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Auditor size has long served as a surrogate measure for audit quality in accounting 
research. Large auditors have greater reputations to protect (DeAngelo 1981). In addition, 
the provision of high quality audits by Big 4 auditors appears to be sensitive to the level of 
litigation risk and regulatory scrutiny. In sharp contrast, non- Big 4 audit engagements 
remain unaffected by such considerations (Francis and Wang 2008; Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen 2008). Even though audit research typically considers non- Big 4 audits of 
lower quality compared to Big 4 audits, there are valid reasons as to why small auditors 
could, in certain settings, be able to deliver superior audit quality compared to their larger 
competitors. Such small- auditor audit quality advantages might not be able to materialize 
in the presence of strong Big 4 auditor incentives to deliver superior audit quality. 
However, in the absence of such incentives, their manifestation becomes more likely. 
Small auditors typically operate as unlimited liability partnerships in which both 
inside and outside wealth of all partners is exposed to ligation threat. Unlimited liability 
status therefore incentivizes auditors to deliver high quality audits and encourages partner 
monitoring (Dye 1993; Dye 1995; Van Lent 1999; Chan and Pae 1998). Furthermore, 
small accounting firms face difficulties in obtaining affordable insurance coverage (GAO 
2008) and have limited ability to acquire high quality legal representation, as well as to 
sustain the financial consequences of a possible monetary penalty. I therefore expect their 
litigation considerations to be significantly high.  
Incentives by non- Big 4 accounting firms to deliver high quality audits could also 
be strong due to the lower switching costs of their clients which increase the likelihood of 
auditor dismissal in the case of audit quality failure (Hennes et al. 2014). Consequently, 
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non- Big 4 auditors have reasons to deliver a sufficiently high level of audit quality in 
order to build a reputation for credible financial reporting and better retain their client base. 
 Moreover, non- Big 4 accounting firms in the private firm market differ from Big 4 
accounting firms in that they typically provide services that are not restricted to the 
external verification of financial statements. Such services pertain to auditor advice and 
feedback on accounting, internal controls, and general business issues (Herda and Lavelle 
2013) and could improve their knowledge about their clients, thus allowing them to deliver 
improved audits. Such a non- Big 4 information acquisition advantage is potentially even 
greater in the private firm market where clients are more likely to resolve information 
asymmetry problems on an “insider basis” (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). 
One might argue that Big 4 auditors invest more in information technology and are 
therefore able to perform audits in a more efficient way. However, private firm clients are 
typically smaller and less complex than public firm clients and therefore such advantages 
are less likely to materialize in the private firm setting. Furthermore, information 
technology has been associated with inefficiencies that could potentially impair audit 
quality, such as decreased coaching opportunities, reduced face- to- face feedback, and 
reduced partner presence at client’s location (Westermann et al. 2014). These inefficiencies 
gain particular importance in the light of findings that, in the private firm market, clients 
prefer a more relational approach in auditing (Fontaine and Pilote 2012). 
In line with these predictions, I find that private firm clients of non- Big 4 auditors 
in the UK are associated with lower levels of total, income increasing, and income 
decreasing absolute discretionary accruals, lower accrual quality, lower level of absolute 
total accruals to absolute cash flow from operations (CFO), as well as greater likelihood of 
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receiving a qualified auditor opinion compared to Big 4 clients. Furthermore, I report no 
statistically significant differences in the level of earnings smoothness between clients of 
Big 4 and non- Big 4 auditors. These findings are robust to a number of additional tests, 
such as using propensity- score matching techniques, examining the relation between 
auditor size and audit quality in a sample of non- Big 4 auditors only, excluding all firms 
that eventually go public, and separately testing the original hypothesis before and after the 
audit partner signature requirement in the UK. Overall, my findings suggest that, in the 
absence of strong large- auditor incentives to deliver superior audit quality, small auditors 
seize an audit quality advantage over their larger competitors in the private firm market. 
This paper contributes to the literature primarily by being the first to document that, 
in the absence of strong litigation, reputation, and regulatory scrutiny considerations, the 
otherwise positive relation between auditor size and audit quality reverses. With the 
exception of Lawrence et al. (2011), prior research has provided evidence of a positive 
relation between auditor size and audit quality in high litigation, reputation, and regulatory 
scrutiny settings (Becker et al. 1998; Francis et al. 1999; Kim et al. 2003; Lennox and 
Pittman 2010; Chan and Wu 2011). The current study extends Van Tendeloo and 
Vanstraelen (2008) in that it provides further insights into the moderating role of auditor 
incentives on the quality of services provided by accounting firms in the private firm 
market. It differs, however, by specifically focusing on a setting where large auditors have 
materially weak incentives to deliver high quality audits and by examining the relation 
between auditor size and audit quality using a battery of distinct audit quality proxies 
rather than a single, aggregated earnings management measure.  
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In addition, the current paper contributes to the literature that focuses on the 
importance of determinants of audit quality. Khurana and Raman (2004) and Francis and 
Wang (2008) argue that litigation considerations mainly account for the Big 4 versus non- 
Big 4 differences in audit quality, whereas Skinner and Srinivasan (2012) document the 
importance of reputation considerations in determining audit quality. By providing 
evidence of a negative relation between auditor size and audit quality in the absence of 
strong reputation, litigation, and regulatory scrutiny considerations, I provide findings 
consistent with these arguments. In addition, I evaluate the moderating role of these 
considerations relative to the importance of competing explanations in shaping the Big 4 
versus non- Big 4 audit quality differences. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, I review the 
related literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3.3 presents the empirical models. In 
section 3.4, I describe the sample selection process and offer descriptive statistics, while in 
section 3.5, I present the empirical results and additional robustness tests. Section 3.6 
concludes. 
3.2 Background and Hypothesis Development 
Accounting literature seems to conclude that Big 4 auditors deliver superior audit 
quality compared to non- Big 4 auditors. Dopuch and Simunic (1980) and DeAngelo 
(1981) argue that Big 4 auditors have stronger incentives to provide high quality audits 
because they have greater reputations to protect. Khurana and Raman (2004) and Francis 
and Wang (2008) focus on the importance of litigation considerations and regulatory 
oversight in construing the Big 4 audit quality advantage. Alternative explanations include 
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the fact that large auditors are better able to attract and retain higher quality human capital 
(Dopuch and Simunic 1982), invest more in information technology (Chaney et al. 2004), 
and are less financially dependent on any individual client, making them less likely to 
compromise their independence (DeAngelo 1981). Consistent with these arguments, a 
number of empirical studies have provided evidence of a positive relation between auditor 
size and audit quality (Teoh and Wong 1993; Becker et al. 1998; Khurana and Raman 
2004; Behn et al. 2008; Lennox and Pittman 2010).  
Audit research has not explicitly tried to disentangle the importance of auditor 
incentives from that of competing explanations. However, there is strong evidence that 
reputation, litigation, and regulatory scrutiny considerations play a very important role in 
the relation between auditor size and audit quality. At the extreme, when these 
considerations become sufficiently weak, Big 4 auditors no longer appear to be associated 
with superior audit quality. For instance, Khurana and Raman (2004) find that, the positive 
relation between auditor size and perceived audit quality dwindles outside the US. They 
attribute their findings to the lower litigation risk that characterizes non- US settings, even 
when considering other common law countries such as the UK, Canada, and Australia. 
Furthermore, Chaney et al. (2004) report that UK private firm auditees do not regard Big 4 
auditors superior to non- Big 4 auditors to a degree significant enough to justify paying a 
fee premium for their services. In addition, Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008) who 
investigate the Big 4 versus non- Big 4 differences in the European private firm setting, 
conclude that Big 4 auditors restrict aggressive earnings management only in high book- 
tax conformity countries. They reason that, in the private firm market, the Big 4 audit 
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quality advantage is primarily a function of the degree of regulatory scrutiny by tax 
authorities.     
Auditor reputation and litigation considerations are significantly mitigated in the 
private firm setting (Johnstone and Bedard 2004; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008; 
Hope and Langli 2010). This is true even for countries with strict legal institutions and 
high levels of investor protection (Chaney et al. 2004; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
2008). The UK private firm market therefore qualifies as a setting in which auditor 
litigation and reputation considerations are significantly low. In addition, the UK has been 
classified as a country with low financial and tax reporting alignment. This further reduces 
auditor incentives for high quality audits because of the lower level of regulatory scrutiny 
by tax authorities (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008). 
In settings in which auditor incentives to deliver high quality audits are materially 
weakened, the relation between auditor size and audit quality becomes less obvious. This 
is particularly true in the private firm setting where firms are typically smaller and less 
complex than in the public setting and often convey their true economic performance 
through the use of insider communication channels. In this paper I argue that, in the 
absence of strong litigation, reputation, and regulatory scrutiny considerations, incentives 
of small accounting firms to maintain a sufficient level of audit quality, as well as reasons 
pertinent to their general business model could potentially cause the otherwise positive 
relation between auditor size and audit quality to reverse. 
Audit literature generally supports the argument that non- Big 4 auditors have lower 
litigation considerations compared to their larger competitors. Large auditors have deeper 
pockets and, consequently, more wealth at risk in the event of litigation (Dye 1993). 
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Furthermore, due to their greater wealth, large auditors are also more likely to be called as 
defendants in lawsuits (Lennox 1999). One could argue, however, that conditional on a 
lawsuit against an auditor being filed, Big 4 auditors are better able to sustain its 
consequences compared to non- Big 4 auditors. In particular, due to their greater wealth, 
larger auditors have better access to high quality legal representation and are better able to 
sustain the financial discomfort of a potential monetary penalty against them. Under this 
hypothesis, small auditors are particularly vulnerable to the consequences of lawsuits 
against them and therefore their litigation considerations are probably strong.  
Such considerations are potentially aggravated by the organizational form of non- 
Big 4 auditors. Small accounting firms are typically organized as unlimited partnerships. 
Under this organizational form, both inside and outside wealth of all partners is exposed to 
litigation. Unlimited liability signals that a firm stands to lose everything in a negligence 
lawsuit (Van Lent 1999). It therefore encourages monitoring among auditors and 
incentivizes them to deliver superior audit quality (Dye 1993; Dye 1995; Chan and Pae 
1998; Van Lent 1999). In contrast, larger accounting firms typically operate as limited 
liability partnerships (LLPs) (Lennox and Li 2012). Under limited liability status, wealth 
outside the audit firm is subject to litigation risk only for negligent auditors. Therefore, by 
protecting the outside wealth of non- negligent partners, LLP status significantly reduces 
the liability exposure of accounting firms (Lennox and Li 2012).  
These arguments gain particular importance in the light of findings by the US 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) that non- Big 4 accounting firms have 
difficulties in finding affordable liability insurance coverage (GAO 2008). Small auditors 
lack the size needed to achieve economies of scale to spread their litigation risk and 
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insurance costs across a larger capital base (GAO 2003). To the degree that these concerns 
incentivize small auditors to deliver a relatively “fixed” level of sufficiently high audit 
quality, they could also partly account for the inelasticity of non- Big 4 audits to variation 
in the overall level of litigation and regulatory scrutiny compared to Big 4 audits. For 
example, Francis and Wang (2008) find that, although the audit quality of Big 4 
accounting firms is a function of the degree of investor protection and regulatory oversight, 
the quality of smaller accounting firms does not appear to be affected by these 
considerations. That is, non- Big 4 auditors may still have strong litigation considerations 
and therefore deliver sufficiently high quality audits even if their audit quality does not 
vary with the overall litigation level. 
Furthermore, clients of non- Big 4 auditors typically have lower switching costs 
than clients of Big 4 auditors. Non- Big 4 clients, are smaller and less complex than Big 4 
clients. They therefore have lower start- up costs and a larger set of alternative auditors to 
choose from. As a result, non- Big 4 auditors are more likely to be dismissed in the event 
of an audit quality failure (Hennes et al. 2014). On the other hand, Lennox (1999) finds 
that large auditors that become subject to criticism for inaccurate reporting do not suffer 
reductions in demand. Consequently, the low switching costs of non- Big 4 clients could 
encourage small accounting firms to deliver high quality audits in order to create a 
reputation for credible reporting and therefore build client loyalty.  
In the private firm setting, non- Big 4 accounting firms additionally differ in the 
type of services that they offer to their clients. Herda and Lavelle (2013) argue that “the 
websites of several (private firm) non-Big 4 accounting firms characterize their assurance 
services as services that provide value beyond the traditional audit”. That is, non- Big 4 
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auditors provide additional support to their clients in the form of advice on accounting and 
internal control issues as well as on how to improve decision making, profitability, and 
administrative procedures. These services add value to clients without necessarily being 
standalone, fee- generating assignments (Knechel 2007; Herda and Lavelle 2013). I 
therefore argue that non- Big 4 auditors can better understand the business model and 
inherent risks of their clients. This latter observation is in line with the findings of Louis 
(2005), who reports that acquirers audited by non-Big 4 accounting firms outperform those 
audited by Big 4 firms. Louis (2005) supports the view that non- Big 4 auditors have 
superior advisory skills because they have better knowledge of the local markets and closer 
relations with their clients. In addition, Boone et al. (2000) argue that the services of small 
accounting firms are more personalized than those of large auditors because of their 
superior client- specific information acquisition advantages. On the other hand, small 
clients of large accounting firms are frustrated by the poor service that they receive and the 
quality of the personnel assigned to them (Berton 1994). These factors could allow non- 
Big 4 auditors to deliver improved audit quality, particularly in the private firm setting 
where firms are more likely to resolve information asymmetry on an “insider basis” (Ball 
and Shivakumar 2005).  Consistent with these arguments, Simunic (1984) purports that 
auditor knowledge gained from providing services not directly linked to the audit function 
could result in audit- related knowledge spillovers.  
Finally, Big 4 auditors typically invest more in information technology (IT). They 
are therefore considered better able to perform audits in an efficient way. Such advantages, 
however, are less likely to materialize in the private firm market where clients are smaller 
and less complex than in the public firm market. Furthermore, recent evidence has given 
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rise to a number of inefficiencies associated with the over- reliance of auditors on IT. In 
particular, using data from interviews with audit partners at a Big 4 audit firm, 
Westermann et al. (2014) find that IT hampers the development of appropriate behaviors, 
such as critical thinking, and increases distraction. Interviewed auditors emphasized the 
loss of human interaction and its potential consequences for audit quality, client retention, 
and on the job learning. Audit partners seem to agree that valuable information is lost 
when the auditor cannot “see the person’s reaction and look them in the eye” (Westermann 
et al. 2014). This latter observation is particularly important in the light of findings that 
audit clients in the private firm setting prefer a more relational approach in auditing 
(Fontaine and Pilote 2012). Large accounting firms are typically more reliant on IT than 
their smaller competitors. For this reason, I expect Big 4 auditors to be more likely to 
experience the consequences of IT- related inefficiencies on audit quality and auditor 
learning.    
Despite strong reasons as to why non- Big 4 auditors would be able to deliver 
higher quality audits compared to Big 4 auditors, it is not ex- ante clear whether the 
absence of strong litigation, reputation, and regulatory scrutiny consideration would be 
sufficient for such advantages to materialize. I therefore formulate my hypothesis (in null 
format) as follows: 
H0: There is no relation between auditor size and audit quality in the UK 
private firm setting. 
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3.3 Methodology 
3.3.1 Audit Quality Measures 
The audit quality proxies that I consider are the following: the level of absolute 
discretionary accruals, accrual quality, the level of absolute total accruals to absolute CFO, 
earnings smoothness, and the propensity of firm receiving a qualified auditor opinion. 
3.3.1.1 Absolute Discretionary Accruals (ADA) 
I estimate performance- adjusted discretionary accruals following Kothari et al. 
(2005). In particular, I perform annual cross- sectional regressions of the following model 
for every two- digit SIC code: 
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕 = 𝒂𝟎 + 𝜶𝟏𝚫𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟐𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜶𝟑𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕   (1), 
where: 
𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕:  The total accruals of firm i in year t, calculated as change in current assets less 
change in current liabilities less change in cash plus change in short- term debt less 
depreciation (𝑆𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = Δ𝐶𝑈𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝐶𝑈𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝐸𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ).  
𝜟𝑺𝒂𝒍𝒆𝒔𝒊,𝒕: The change in sales of firm i in year t relative to year t-1.  
𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕: The property, plant, and equipment of firm i in year t.  
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕: The ratio of net income before extraordinary items of firm i in year t to total assets 
in year t-1. 
𝜺𝑺𝑻𝑨𝒊,𝒕: The error term. 
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I scale all non- ratio variables by total assets in year t-1. I further winsorize all 
variables at the 1% and 99% levels. My measure of absolute discretionary accruals is the 
absolute value of the firm- specific residuals estimated from regression (1). 
3.3.1.2 Accrual Quality (AQ) 
My accrual quality measure is the Dechow and Dichev (2002) measure modified by 
McNichols (2002), which captures the extent to which working capital accruals map on 
past, present, and future CFO: 
𝑾𝑪𝑨𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕+𝟏 + 𝜷𝟒𝚫𝐒𝐚𝐥𝐞𝐬𝒊,𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑷𝑷𝑬𝒊,𝒕
+ 𝜺𝒊,𝒕   (𝟐), 
 
where: 
𝐖𝐂𝐀𝐢,𝐭:  The working capital accruals of firm i in year t, calculated as change in current 
assets less change in current liabilities less change in cash plus change in short- term debt 
(𝑊𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 = Δ𝐶𝑈𝐴𝑆𝑖,𝑡 − Δ𝐶𝑈𝐿𝐼𝑖,𝑡 − 𝛥𝐶𝐴𝑆𝐻𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛥𝑆𝑇𝐷𝐵𝑖,𝑡 ).  
𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕: The cash flow from operations of firm i in year t calculated as net income before 
extraordinary items less total accruals (𝐶𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑁𝐼𝐵𝐸𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑇𝐴𝑖,𝑡 ).  
Remaining variables are defined as previously. I scale all variables by total assets in 
year t-1 and winsorize them at the 1% and 99% levels. I further estimate equation (2) for 
each year and 2- digit SIC code, while requiring at least 20 observations per regression. 
My accrual quality measure is the 3-year standard deviation of the firm- year residuals 
estimated in the previous step. 
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3.3.1.3 Absolute Total Accruals to Absolute CFO (TACFO) 
My third audit quality measure is the ratio of absolute total accruals to absolute 
CFO (Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 2008). Total accruals and CFO are defined as 
previously. 
3.3.1.4 Earnings Smoothness (Smooth) 
I define my measure of earnings smoothness as the ratio of the 3-year standard 
deviation of operating income to the 3-year standard deviation of CFO (Burgstahler et al. 
2006; Dou et al. 2013). CFO are defined as previously. 
3.3.1.5 Auditor Opinion (Opin) 
My final audit quality measure is the propensity of a firm receiving a qualified 
auditor opinion (DeFond et al. 2002; Francis and Yu 2009). I define this variable as an 
indicator that takes the value of 1 if a firm receives a qualified auditor opinion on a specific 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
3.3.2 Empirical Models 
To test my hypothesis, I use the following OLS model for all continuous audit 
quality measures (absolute discretionary accruals, accrual quality, absolute total accruals to 
absolute cash flow from operations, and earnings smoothness): 
𝑴𝒆𝒂𝒔𝒖𝒓𝒆𝒊,𝒕 = 𝜸𝟎 + 𝜸𝟏𝑩𝟒𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝑬 + 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝑭𝑬 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕   (𝟑), 
where Measurei,t is the corresponding audit quality measure. For the auditor opinion 
specification, I perform regression 3 using logit estimation techniques. However, due to 
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the incidental parameter problem when using fixed effects with logit specifications, as a 
robustness check, I repeat all logit regressions using OLS estimation techniques as well. In 
all specifications, I use heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors, 
clustered at the firm level.  
Control Variables 
In line with prior literature (Burgstahler et al. 2006; Van Tendeloo and Vanstraelen 
2008; Francis and Yu 2009), I include the following audit quality determinants: I control 
for firm size (LnToas) calculated as the natural logarithm of total assets because larger 
firms typically have higher earnings quality (Becker et al. 1998). I include a control for 
leverage (Leverage) motivated by the debt covenant hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 
1986). I calculate this variable as the ratio of total debt divided by lagged total assets. I 
control for profitability (ROA) and firms that report negative net income (Loss) to capture 
the link between firm performance and financial reporting quality. I further include sales 
growth (Growth), defined as the percentage change in sales, and predict a negative relation 
with earnings quality (Menon and Williams 2004). I also control the ratio of current assets 
to current liabilities (Curr) as well as Altman’s Z-score (Z-Score). Lower values of the 
latter variable indicate more financial distress. For the auditor opinion specification, I 
additionally include lagged indicators of variables Opin (Lagged Opin) and Loss (Lagged 
Loss) following Francis and Yu (2009). Finally, I include industry and year fixed effects. I 
estimate industry fixed effects using 2-digit SIC codes. I winsorize all continuous, non- 
logarithmic variables at the 1% and 99% levels. Detailed definitions of all variables can be 
found in Appendix B.  
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3.3.3 Propensity- Score Matching 
Propensity- score matching mitigates the bias that arises from differences in the 
treatment effect caused by firm- specific characteristics. In addition, it alleviates the impact 
of non- linearities in the estimated treatment effect when the underlying functional form is 
non- linear (Lawrence et al. 2011; Minutti-Meza 2013). To evaluate the extent to which 
firm- specific characteristics drive the Big 4 versus non- Big 4 differences, I estimate the 
probability of selecting a Big 4 auditor using the following logit model: 
𝑩𝟒𝒊,𝒕 = 𝝀𝟎 + 𝑪𝒐𝒏𝒕𝒓𝒐𝒍𝒔 + 𝒀𝒆𝒂𝒓 𝑭𝑬 + 𝑰𝒏𝒅𝒖𝒔𝒕𝒓𝒚 𝑭𝑬 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕   (4) 
Controls include all determinants of the corresponding regression. I subsequently 
match, without replacement, a non- Big 4 client with a Big 4 client with the closest 
predicted value from equation (4), while allowing a maximum caliper distance of 1%.  
3.4 Data  
3.4.1 Sample Selection 
My source of financial data is the December 2013 file of Amadeus database 
supplied by Bureau van Dijk. In particular, my sample consists of all UK private firms that 
are classified by Amadeus as very large-, large-, or medium- sized. That is, firms that meet 
at least one of the following conditions in their last available year: a) operating revenue 
greater than or equal to EUR 1 million, b) total assets greater than or equal to EUR 2 
million, and c) number of employees greater than or equal to 15. As a result, very small 
55
 
 
firms are not included in the sample. I additionally derive my auditor opinion data from 
FAME database1. 
I remove financials (one- digit SIC code 6) as well as firms without industry 
classification. I also exclude firms with fiscal years other than 12 months. I further delete 
subsidiaries of publicly listed companies following Burgstahler et al. (2006) and Van 
Tendeloo and Vanstraelen (2008). Finally, I remove observations with negative total 
assets, sales, and debt, as well as observations with missing data in the variables of 
interest. 
Financial data in Amadeus is retained for a rolling period of up to 10 years. When a 
new year of data is added, the oldest year is dropped. This means that only the most recent 
data of each company is available. Due to this restriction, sufficient data for both samples 
is available for the period 2005-2012. Furthermore, the online version of Amadeus 
contains auditor and quoted status data that correspond only to the last available fiscal year 
for each firm. In other words, Amadeus does not provide historical data about the auditor 
name and quoted status in its online version. In order to overcome this limitation and 
create a longer time- series of auditor and quoted status data, I retrieve this information 
from older Amadeus updates. To this end, I retrieve the auditor name and quoted status 
from eight (8) yearly Amadeus updates that cover the period 2005 to 20122. This procedure 
results in a total of 97,818 firm- year observations and 25,503 firms for the sample that 
consists of all firm- year observations with sufficient data to be included in at least one of 
                                                            
1 I thank Bureau van Dijk for graciously providing the auditor opinion data. 
2 Each update yields one auditor name and quoted status indicator per firm. For each update and firm, I match the 
auditor name and quoted status with that firm’s financial data from the December 2013 online version. To 
perform the matching, I require that the online version fiscal year and the last available fiscal year of the 
corresponding update are the same. Accordingly, the auditor and quoted status information provided in the online 
version is retained only for the last available year of the same version. 
56
 
 
the regression analyses. Table 3.1, Panel A presents the sample selection procedure. Panel 
B shows the distribution of the number of firms per fiscal year for the period 2005-2012. 
 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations  
Table 3.2 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables of interest. Roughly one 
third of all observations represent Big 4 clients. This means that a significant percentage of 
UK private firms are audited by smaller accounting firms. The absolute discretionary 
accruals of the average firm amount to 0.066, whereas for accrual quality, the ratio of 
Initial Sample 918,631
-224,481
-40,221
-555,698
-413
97,818
Fiscal Sear
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Sum 97,818
Panel B: Number of Observations per Fiscal Year
    Less observations with missing matched auditor name
Final Sample
Panel A: Sample Selection Procedure
TABLE 3.1
    Less financials
    Less privately held subsidiaries of quoted companies
    Less observations without required financial data
Panel A presents the sample selection procedure.The final sample consists of all firm- year
observations with sufficient data to be included in at least one of the regression analyses. Panel B
presents the distribution of the final sample per fiscal year for the period 2005- 2012.
Number of Observations
8,320
9,845
10,288
10,742
11,847
12,884
18,254
15,638
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absolute total accruals to absolute cash flow from operations, and earnings smoothness the 
corresponding values are 0.036, 0.77, and 0.447, respectively. On average, financial 
statements that have received a qualified auditor opinion represent roughly 1% of the 
sample. 
 
Table 3.3 presents the Pearson correlations of the variables of interest. There is a 
positive and significant correlation (0.443) between firm size and auditor size, which is 
consistent with large firms being more likely to appoint Big 4 auditors.  Moreover, having 
a Big 4 auditor is positively associated with the level of absolute discretionary accruals 
(0.071), the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure (0.111), and the ratio of 
absolute total accruals to absolute cash flow from operations (0.031). Furthermore, there is 
a negative correlation between auditor size and earnings smoothness (-0.001), as well as  
the  propensity  of  receiving a  qualified  auditor  opinion  (-0.049). These correlations  are  
Variables N Mean St. Deviation 25% Median 75%
Big 4 97,818 0.3330 0.4710 0 0 1
ADA 97,818 0.1020 0.1080 0.0286 0.0660 0.1340
AQ 26,751 0.0491 0.0434 0.0199 0.0361 0.0635
TACFO 97,803 1.6780 3.7180 0.4120 0.7700 1.2720
Smooth 75,880 0.7330 0.9180 0.2070 0.4470 0.8810
Opin 92,388 0.0089 0.0940 0 0 0
LnToas 97,818 16.1800 1.5750 15.1700 15.9800 17.0500
ROA 97,818 0.0619 0.1120 0.0105 0.0448 0.0994
Lvg 97,818 0.3060 0.3220 0.0622 0.2180 0.4460
Curr 97,818 1.9110 1.8060 1.0250 1.3840 2.1120
Growth 97,818 0.1200 0.4380 -0.0483 0.0496 0.2400
Loss 97,818 0.1740 0.3790 0 0 0
Z- Score 97,818 3.4030 1.9260 2.1570 3.2950 4.4450
TABLE 3.2
Descriptive Statistics
This table presents summary statistics for all firm- year observations with sufficient data to be
included in at least one of the regression analyses. All continuous, non- logarithmic variables
have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. See Appendix for variable definitions.
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Big 4 ADA AQ TACFO Smooth Opin LnToas ROA Lvg Curr Growth Loss Z- Score
Big 4 1
ADA 0.0710 1
AQ 0.1114 0.3416 1
TACFO 0.0310 0.0460 0.0602 1
Smooth -0.0077 -0.1404 0.0567 0.0404 1
Opin -0.0485 -0.0183 -0.0148 0.0041 -0.0021 1
LnToas 0.4432 -0.0736 -0.0802 0.0106 -0.0577 -0.0034 1
ROA -0.0216 0.1317 0.1370 -0.0220 0.0335 -0.0192 -0.1040 1
Lvg 0.1443 0.1304 0.0643 0.0079 -0.0265 -0.0046 0.1452 -0.2348 1
Curr 0.0671 0.0092 0.0594 0.0517 0.0198 0.0105 0.0280 0.1043 -0.2232 1
Growth -0.0470 0.1387 0.0333 -0.0048 -0.0054 -0.0113 -0.0329 0.2722 0.0529 -0.0908 1
Loss 0.0801 0.0061 0.1020 0.0688 0.0694 0.0066 0.0300 -0.5400 0.2265 -0.0588 -0.1638 1
Z- Score -0.1755 -0.0008 -0.0043 0.0037 0.0150 -0.0013 -0.2617 0.3988 -0.5435 0.3332 0.1712 -0.2974 1
This table presents the correlation matrix for all firm- year observations with sufficient data to be included in at least one of the regression
analyses. All continuous, non- logarithmic variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels. Bold values indicate significance at the two-
tailed 5% level. See Appendix for variable definitions.
TABLE 3.3
Correlation Matrix
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significant at the 5% or 1% levels and provide some initial evidence of a negative relation 
between auditor size and audit quality. 
3.5 Results 
3.5.1 Univariate Comparisons 
In Table 3.4, I present the Big 4 versus non- Big 4 univariate comparisons for the 
full and the propensity- score matched samples. The full sample analysis shows that Big 4 
clients are, on average, larger, less profitable and more leveraged than non- Big 4 clients. 
In addition, clients of Big 4 auditors have, on average, greater current ratios but they 
exhibit lower sales growth and they are more likely to report losses and be financially 
distressed than clients of non- Big 4 auditors. These differences are statistically significant 
at the 1% level. Furthermore, Big 4 private firm clients have, on average, 0.016 more 
absolute discretionary accruals than non- Big 4 clients. The difference is statistically 
significant at the 1% level and corresponds to 15.7% of the sample mean absolute 
discretionary accruals. In addition, clients of large accounting firms have, on average, 
higher levels of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure, greater ratios of 
absolute total accruals to absolute CFO, higher smoothness levels, and are less likely to 
receive a qualified auditor opinion. These differences are highly statistically significant (at 
the 5% level for smoothness and 1% level for all other measures) and correspond to 
roughly 20.4%, 14.5%, and 2% of the average accrual quality level, absolute total accruals 
to absolute CFO ratio, and earnings smoothness level, respectively. Moreover, non- Big 4 
clients are almost 5 times more likely to receive a qualified auditor opinion than Big 4 
clients.  
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The propensity- score matched sample analysis shows the Big 4 versus non- Big 4 
differences in means in the matched sample. The analysis shows that, in contrast to the full 
sample, the differences in the firm- specific characteristics on which the matching is 
performed are no longer statistically significantly different between the two subgroups3. 
That is, Big 4 and non- Big 4 clients exhibit no statistically significant differences in size, 
profitability, leverage, current ratio, sales growth, likelihood of reporting a loss, and level 
of financial distress. This finding provides reassurance that the matching has been 
successfully implemented. The matched sample analysis also shows that the differences in 
means between the Big 4 and non- Big 4 subsamples largely persist after the matching. 
With the exception of smoothness, for which the difference now becomes insignificant, 
Big 4 clients are still associated with higher levels of absolute discretionary accruals, 
higher levels of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure, larger absolute 
total accruals to absolute CFO ratios, and a lower propensity to receive a qualified auditor 
opinion. These differences are statistically significant at the 1% level and amount to 
approximately 19.2%, 21.4%, and 11% of the average accrual quality level, absolute total 
accruals to absolute CFO ratio, and earnings smoothness level, respectively. Furthermore, 
non- Big 4 clients are now more than 5 times more likely to receive a qualified auditor 
opinion. These results seem to indicate that, after the matching, the differences in means 
between the Big 4 and non- Big 4 subsamples become even larger for three out of the five 
audit quality proxies. 
                                                            
3 This analysis presents the outcome of the matching procedure that is based on the main determinants of 
regression (3). Results are qualitatively identical when I additionally match on lagged loss and lagged auditor 
opinion. Under this alternative specification, the corresponding differences of variables Lagged Loss and Lagged 
Opin are insignificant as well, whereas all test variables retain the sign and significance levels presented in Table 
3.4.  
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Variables No. Obs
Big 4 
Mean    
Std. Dev.
Non- Big 4 
Mean       
Std. Dev.
Difference 
in Means              
t-statistic
No. Obs
Big 4 
Mean    
Std. Dev
Non- Big 4 
Mean       
Std. Dev.
Difference 
in Means             
t-statistic
ADA 97,818 0.1129 0.0967 0.0162*** 45,236 0.1141 0.0945 0.0196***
0.1181 0.1021 22.25 0.1168 0.1035 18.91
AQ 25,085 0.0554 0.0454 0.01*** 12,646 0.0546 0.0441 0.0105***
0.0477 0.0402 18.34 0.0463 0.0403 13.69
TACFO 97,803 1.8413 1.5970 0.2442*** 45,228 1.8072 1.6228 0.1844***
3.9836 3.5757 9.69 3.9214 3.5952 5.21
Smooth 75,880 0.7231 0.7381 -0.0149** 33,938 0.7318 0.7326 -0.0007
0.9291 0.9128 -2.12 0.9219 0.9099 -0.08
Opin 66,829 0.0025 0.0122 -0.0096*** 30,127 0.0026 0.0134 -0.0107***
0.0500 0.1096 -14.77 0.0512 0.1150 -10.94
LnToas 97,818 17.1709 15.6901 1.4807*** 45,236 16.4706 16.4735 -0.0028
1.7064 1.2386 150.00 1.3207 1.2405 0.24
ROA 97,818 0.0585 0.0636 -0.0051*** 45,236 0.0604 0.0601 -0.0001
0.1247 0.1050 -6.75 0.1255 0.1074 -0.22
Lvg 97,818 0.3789 0.2769 0.1019*** 45,236 0.3321 0.3342 -0.002
0.3769 0.2959 48.50 0.3530 0.3311 -0.63
Curr 97,818 2.0828 1.8256 0.2572*** 45,236 1.9864 1.9894 -0.0029
2.0765 1.6472 21.05 1.8114 1.9752 -0.17
Growth 97,818 0.0905 0.1342 -0.0437*** 45,236 0.1040 0.1064 -0.0023
0.3835 0.4626 -14.72 0.4144 0.3984 -0.63
Loss 97,818 0.2174 0.1529 0.0645*** 45,236 0.1930 0.1971 -0.0041
0.4125 0.3599 25.14 0.3947 0.3979 -1.12
Z- Score 97,818 2.9247 3.6417 -0.717*** 45,236 3.2173 3.2253 -0.008
1.9723 1.8569 -55.76 1.9652 1.8345 -0.45
This table presents the Big 4 versus non- Big 4 univariate comparisons for the full and the
propensity- score matched sample. All continuous, non- logarithmic variables have been winsorized
at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-
tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix for variable definitions.
TABLE 3.4
Big 4 Versus Non- Big 4 Univariate Comparisons
Propensity- Score Matched SampleFull Sample
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3.5.2 Multivariate Results 
3.5.2.1 Absolute Discretionary Accruals 
Table 3.5 presents the results of the regression of absolute discretionary accruals on 
the Big 4 indicator and the control variables for the full and the propensity- score matched 
samples. The first two columns of the table correspond to the regressions of the total 
absolute discretionary accruals. The middle two and the last two columns of Table 3.5 
show the results for the income increasing and income decreasing absolute discretionary 
accruals only. The regressions of Table 3.5 cover the period 2005- 2012. 
The full sample of the total absolute discretionary accrual specification consists of 
97,818 firm- year observations, whereas the corresponding propensity- score matched 
sample consists of 45,236 firm- year observations. Consistent with the univariate results, 
the analysis of the total absolute discretionary accruals shows that Big 4 auditors are 
associated with higher levels of absolute discretionary accruals compared to non- Big 4 
auditors. The difference is highly statistically significant (at the 1% level) and amounts, on 
average, to roughly 2.15% of total assets. The matched sample analysis yields similar 
results: Big 4 clients have, on average, 1.98% of total assets more absolute discretionary 
accruals compared to non- Big 4 clients. This coefficient is also highly statistically 
significant (at the 1% level). Moreover, large firms are associated with lower levels of 
absolute discretionary accruals, whereas firms with high ROA and current ratios, more 
leveraged firms, growing firms, as well as loss making firms are associated with greater 
levels of absolute discretionary accruals.  
The next two columns of Table 3.5 present the results of the analysis that is based 
on   the  income  increasing  absolute  discretionary accruals. This   analysis  is  based  on a  
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sample of 48,958 (22,396) firm- year observations for the full (propensity- score matched) 
sample and yields results that are consistent with original findings. That is, Big 4 auditors 
are associated with higher levels of income increasing absolute discretionary accruals in 
Variables
Full Sample
 Matched 
Sample
Full Sample
 Matched 
Sample
Full Sample
 Matched 
Sample
B4 0.0215*** 0.0198*** 0.0277*** 0.0258*** 0.0148*** 0.0143***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LnToas -0.0083*** -0.0078*** -0.0116*** -0.0116*** -0.0054*** -0.0043***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.1538*** 0.1476*** 0.1072*** 0.0842*** 0.2063*** 0.2222***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lvg 0.0582*** 0.0624*** -0.0246*** -0.0221*** 0.1203*** 0.1211***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Curr 0.0019*** 0.0024*** -0.0024*** -0.0016*** 0.0045*** 0.0053***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Growth 0.0236*** 0.0238*** 0.0282*** 0.0268*** 0.0139*** 0.0192***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Loss 0.0192*** 0.0175*** 0.0237*** 0.0192*** 0.0149*** 0.0188***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Z- Score 0.0005 0.0007 -0.0036*** -0.0037*** 0.0045*** 0.0038***
(0.139) (0.198) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.1657*** 0.1474*** 0.2669*** 0.2659*** 0.0762*** 0.0559***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 97,818 45,236 48,958 22,396 48,860 22,466
R-squared 0.0990 0.1020 0.0870 0.0869 0.1730 0.1868
This table presents the OLS regressions of total, income decreasing, and income increasing
absolute discretionary accruals (ADA) on auditor size for the full and the propensity- score
matched samples (2005- 2012). All continuous, non- logarithmic variables have been
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix for
variable definitions.
ADA Income Decreasing ADA Income Increasing ADA
TABLE 3.5
Regressions of Absolute Discretionary Accruals on Auditor Size
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both the full and the propensity- score matched samples. The coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 1% level and seem to indicate that non- Big 4 auditors are more 
successful in restricting income increasing earnings management. 
The final two columns of Table 3.5 show the results of the analysis that is based on 
income decreasing absolute discretionary accruals. The sample size amounts to 48,860 
(22,466) firm- year observations for the full (propensity- score matched) sample. Once 
again, results are in line with previous findings. In particular, clients of non- Big 4 auditors 
are characterized by lower absolute values of income decreasing discretionary accruals 
than clients of Big 4 auditors. The corresponding coefficients are highly statistically 
significant (at the 1% level) in both the full and the propensity- score matched 
specifications and provide evidence of a non- Big 4 audit quality advantage in limiting 
income decreasing earnings management as well. 
3.5.2.2 Accrual Quality 
Table 3.6 presents the results of the regressions that examine the relation between 
auditor size and audit quality using a number of additional audit quality proxies. The first 
two columns present the analysis that is based on the McNichols (2002) modification of 
the Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality measure. Higher values of this measure 
correspond to lower earnings quality. Due to the data restrictions of the Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) measure, the accrual quality analysis is limited to fiscal years 2007- 2011 
and is based on a full (propensity- score matched) sample of 25,085 (12,646) firm- year 
observations. In line with previous findings, Big 4 auditors are associated with lower 
accrual quality under both specifications. The corresponding coefficients for the full and 
the propensity- score matched sample amount to 0.0113 and 0.0106, respectively, and are 
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statistically significant at the 1% level. In relative terms, these differences amount to 
roughly 25.9% and 24.2% of the corresponding interquartile range. 
 
Variables
Full Sample
 Matched 
Sample
Full Sample
 Matched 
Sample
Full Sample
 Matched 
Sample
B4 0.0113*** 0.0106*** 0.1882*** 0.1877*** -0.0037 0.0024
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.733) (0.843)
LnToas -0.0040*** -0.0038*** 0.0015 -0.0151 -0.0314*** -0.0219***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.880) (0.321) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.0903*** 0.0891*** 0.4137** 0.5500** 0.7013*** 0.5973***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.018) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000)
Lvg 0.0143*** 0.0159*** 0.0763 0.0245 -0.0785*** -0.0648***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.104) (0.707) (0.000) (0.003)
Curr 0.0013*** 0.0017*** 0.1084*** 0.1096*** 0.0060** 0.0054
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.031) (0.153)
Growth 0.0025*** 0.0035*** 0.0624** 0.0961** -0.0058 -0.0060
(0.005) (0.007) (0.032) (0.038) (0.515) (0.667)
Loss 0.0224*** 0.0230*** 0.7819*** 0.7883*** 0.2836*** 0.2712***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Z- Score -0.0002 -0.0010** 0.0123 0.0023 -0.0038 -0.0042
(0.503) (0.028) (0.207) (0.870) (0.242) (0.363)
Constant 0.0853*** 0.0849*** 0.9637*** 0.8803** 1.2088*** 1.0372***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 25,085 12,646 97,803 45,228 74,280 33,938
R-squared 0.1305 0.1345 0.0105 0.0117 0.0244 0.0232
This table presents the OLS regressions of accrual quality (AQ) (2007- 2011), ratio of absolute total
accruals to absolute cash flow from operations (TACFO) (2005- 2012), and earnings smoothness
(Smooth) (2006- 2012) on auditor size for the full and the propensity- score matched samples. All
continuous, non- logarithmic variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-values are in 
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. See Appendix for variable definitions.
AQ TACFO Smooth
TABLE 3.6
Regressions of Audit Quality Proxies on Auditor Size
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3.5.2.3 Total Accruals to CFO 
The middle two columns of Table 3.6 present the regressions of the absolute total 
accruals to absolute CFO ratio. The analysis is performed on a sample size of 97,803 
(45,228) firm- year observations for the full (propensity- score matched) sample and 
covers the period 2005-2012. The findings of this analysis provide additional evidence in 
favor of a non- Big 4 audit quality advantage in the UK private firm market. In particular, 
Big 4 auditors are associated with greater ratios of absolute total accruals to absolute CFO 
in both specifications. The coefficients are significant at the 1% level and amount to 
roughly 21.9% and 23.2% of the corresponding interquartile range for the full and the 
propensity- score matched samples, respectively. 
3.5.2.4 Earnings Smoothness 
The last two columns of Table 3.6 present the results of the earnings smoothness 
regressions. This analysis is restricted to years 2006- 2012 due to the additional data 
requirements of the measure. The results indicate no statistically significant differences 
between Big 4 and non- Big 4 clients for both specifications. In untabulated analysis, I 
repeat the two regressions using earnings smoothness measures that are calculated using 5- 
year operating income and CFO standard deviations, as opposed to the current 3- year 
measures. Inferences remain unchanged under this specification as well. That is, both 
smoothness coefficients are not statistically significant. 
3.5.2.5 Auditor Opinion 
Table 3.7 presents the logit regressions of the propensity to receive a qualified 
auditor opinion on the Big 4 indicator and the corresponding controls. The first two 
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columns show the results for the full and the propensity- score matched samples, which 
consist of 66,829 and 30,127 firm- year observations, respectively. Results show that 
clients of Big 4 auditors are less likely to receive a qualified auditor opinion. The 
coefficients on the Big 4 indicator equal -1.492 for the full sample and -1.3739 for the 
propensity- score matched sample and are both statistically significant at the 1% level. Due 
to the incidental parameter problem when using fixed effects in logit specifications, I 
repeat the two regressions using OLS estimation techniques. Results are robust to this 
specification. That is, both coefficients remain negative and statistically significant at the 
1% level.  
A number of prior studies that focus on auditor opinion restrict the analysis to 
samples of distressed firms (Reynolds and Francis 2000; DeFond et al. 2002; Francis and 
Yu 2009). I therefore repeat the auditor opinion regressions on loss- making firms only. 
This alternative specification yields a full sample of 9,714 firm- year observations and a 
propensity- score matched sample of 4,328 firm- year observations. I present the results of 
this analysis in the last two columns of Table 3.7. Table 3.7 shows that inferences are 
unchanged when focusing on distressed firms only. That is, clients of Big 4 auditors are 
less likely to receive a qualified auditor opinion compared to non- Big 4 clients. The 
coefficients in both the full and the propensity- score matched samples are negative and 
significant at the 1% level. Results are qualitatively identical when I use OLS instead of 
logit estimation techniques. 
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Variables
Full Sample Matched Sample
Distressed Firm 
Sample
Matched Sample
B4 -1.4920*** -1.3739*** -1.4912*** -1.2787***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
LnToas 0.0824** -0.0063 0.2036*** 0.0723
(0.018) (0.912) (0.006) (0.534)
ROA -1.1460 0.0063 -4.2537*** -5.0619***
(0.190) (0.995) (0.004) (0.008)
Lvg 0.1876 -0.1329 -0.0195 -0.0081
(0.361) (0.615) (0.957) (0.987)
Curr 0.0378 0.0086 -0.0234 0.0144
(0.161) (0.823) (0.644) (0.835)
Growth -0.1356 -0.7748*** 0.1392 -0.3314
(0.405) (0.004) (0.654) (0.475)
Loss -0.0210 0.2449 - -
(0.905) (0.319)
Z- Score 0.0066 -0.0860 0.0335 0.0387
(0.868) (0.166) (0.575) (0.665)
Lagged Loss 0.3100** 0.1600 0.0820 0.2976
(0.042) (0.468) (0.734) (0.372)
Lagged Opin 5.8539*** 5.9540*** 5.7243*** 5.3877***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant -6.2656*** -17.6632*** -8.3163*** -17.8737***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 66,829 30,127 9,714 4,328
Pseudo R-Squared 0.438 0.431 0.406 0.376
This table presents the logit regressions of the likelihood of receiving a qualified auditor
opinion on auditor size for the full and the propensity- score matched samples (2005- 2012).
The distressed firm sample consists only of all observations with negative net income. All
continuous, non- logarithmic variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99% level. P-
values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. See Appendix for variable definitions.
Likelihood of Receiving a Qualified Audit Opinion
TABLE 3.7
Regressions of  Qualified Auditor Opinion on Auditor Size
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3.5.3 Non- Big 4 Multivariate Analysis 
As a robustness test, I examine the relation between auditor size and audit quality in 
a sample of non- Big 4 clients only. This results in a sample of 66,388 firm- year 
observations. To classify accounting firms as large or small, I calculate the aggregate size 
of their clients (in total assets) and create the indicator variable Large_NB4 which takes the 
value of 1 if the corresponding non- Big 4 accounting firm is larger than the median non- 
Big 4 accounting firm, and zero otherwise. I subsequently regress each of the 5 alternative 
audit quality proxies on variable Large_NB4 and the corresponding controls. Results 
(untabulated) are robust to this specification. That is, the estimated coefficients on absolute 
discretionary accruals, accrual quality, and the ratio of total accruals to CFO are positive 
and statistically significant at the 1% level. Moreover, earnings smoothness is 
insignificant, whereas the coefficient on the auditor opinion indicator is negative and 
statistically significant at the 1% under both logit and OLS specifications. 
In a second step, I derive the corresponding propensity- score matched samples by 
matching a client that is audited by an above median non- Big 4 auditor to a client that is 
audited by a below median non- Big 4 auditor. The matching is performed on the basis of 
the control variables of regression (3). In addition, I include industry and year fixed 
effects. I further require a caliper distance of 1%. This procedure results in sample sizes 
that vary from 11,842 to 50,450 firm- year observations, depending on the specification. 
Table 3.8 presents the results of the regressions on the propensity- score matched samples. 
In particular, clients of large non- Big 4 auditors are associated with more absolute 
discretionary accruals (the 1% level), worse accrual quality (at the 1% level), more 
absolute total accruals to absolute CFO (at  the 5% level), and a lower likelihood to receive 
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ADA AQ TACFO Smooth Opin
Variables
Large_NB4 0.0060*** 0.0033*** 0.0813** 0.0072 -0.2628**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.013) (0.516) (0.031)
LnToas -0.0106*** -0.0050*** -0.0069 -0.0323*** 0.2368***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.691) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.1618*** 0.0828*** -0.2447 0.8626*** -0.3350
(0.000) (0.000) (0.321) (0.000) (0.743)
Lvg 0.0528*** 0.0116*** 0.1256* -0.0810*** 0.2532
(0.000) (0.000) (0.072) (0.001) (0.330)
Curr 0.0015*** 0.0011*** 0.0715*** 0.0080** 0.0572
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.041) (0.108)
Growth 0.0220*** 0.0036*** 0.0860** -0.0026 -0.0648
(0.000) (0.002) (0.029) (0.814) (0.727)
Loss 0.0199*** 0.0196*** 0.7837*** 0.2848*** 0.1282
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.525)
Z- Score -0.0004 0.0002 0.0282** -0.0085** -0.0411
(0.435) (0.635) (0.028) (0.049) (0.395)
Lagged Loss - - - - 0.4319**
(0.013)
Lagged Opin - - - - 5.7853***
(0.000)
Constant 0.2080*** 0.1009*** 1.3817*** 1.3373*** -8.3174***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 50,450 11,842 50,426 38,564 33,146
R-squared 0.0993 0.1260 0.0100 0.0260 0.430
TABLE 3.8
Regressions of Audit Quality Proxies on Auditor Size for Non- Big 4 Clients Only
This table presents the regressions of the level of absolute discretionary accruals
(ADA), accrual quality (AQ), absolute total accruals to absolute CFO (TACFO),
earnings smoothness (Smooth), and the likelhood of receiving a qualified auditor
opinion (Opin) on auditor size for the propensity- score matched sample that consists 
of non- Big 4 clients only. Large_NB4 is an indicator variable that takes the value of 1
if the audit firm is larger than the median non- Big 4 audit firm, and zero otherwise. All
continuous, non- logarithmic variables have been winsorized at the 1% and 99%
levels. P-values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-
tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. See Appendix for variable definitions.
Propensity Score- Matched Sample
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a qualified auditor opinion (at the 5% level4) than clients of small non- Big 4 auditors. 
Earnings smoothness remains insignificant under this specification as well. Overall, these 
findings are consistent with prior results and provide evidence of a negative relation 
between auditor size and audit quality in the non- Big 4 subsample. 
3.5.4 Additional Robustness Tests 
3.5.4.1 Removing Firms that Switch Listing Status 
Decisions pertinent to listing status changes could affect the financial reporting 
quality of private firms for reasons not directly related to the type of auditor they have. For 
example, firms that go public could improve their financial reporting quality in an attempt 
to increase transparency and therefore reduce information asymmetry between them and 
their potential capital providers. Although such firms are more likely to be larger, and thus 
are typically audited by Big 4 auditors, to mitigate concerns that my results are affected by 
incentives linked to listing status changes, I remove all related firm- year observations 
from my initial sample. In particular, I am able to identify 110 unique private firms (209 
firm- year observations) that have been previously, or at some future point, classified as 
publicly listed. Results (untabulated) show that initial findings are not affected by firms 
that switch listing status. Specifically, all related coefficient estimates have identical signs 
and statistical significance levels in both full and propensity- score matched specifications. 
Therefore, listing status switches do not appear to moderate original inferences.  
                                                            
4 Result applies to both logit and OLS specifications.  
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3.5.4.2 Testing Original Hypothesis Before and After Audit Partner Signature 
Requirement 
In 2006 the UK adopted the European Union (EU) Eighth Company Law Directive 
which required engagement partners to sign audit reports. The directive was put into effect 
for all financial years ending in April 2009 or later. The basic premise of audit partner 
signature requirement was to enhance partner accountability and thus improve audit 
quality. Carcello and Li (2013) find evidence consistent with this argument in the UK 
public firm setting. To evaluate the robustness of original findings before and after the 
audit partner signature requirement, I repeat the main analysis after splitting the initial 
sample to those fiscal years ending before and after April 2009. In both subsamples I find 
results (not tabulated) qualitatively similar to original findings. That is, clients of Big 4 
auditors are associated with higher levels of absolute total accruals, lower accrual quality, 
greater total accrual to CFO ratios, and lower propensity to receive a qualified auditor 
opinion. The corresponding coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level in both 
subsamples and alternative specifications (full and propensity- score matched). Earnings 
smoothness remains insignificant in all tests. Overall, these findings seem to confirm the 
existence of a negative relation between auditor size and audit quality in the UK private 
firm setting both before and after the audit partner signature requirement in 2009. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The consensus in audit literature seems to be that large accounting firms provide 
superior audit quality compared to their smaller competitors. In the current paper, I 
investigate the relation between auditor size and audit quality in the UK private firm 
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setting where Big 4 auditors have reduced litigation, reputation, and regulatory scrutiny 
considerations. I argue that, in the absence of strong incentives by large auditors to deliver 
superior audits, non- Big 4 private firm auditors could even seize an audit quality 
advantage due to better knowledge of their clients as well as incentives to deliver a 
sufficiently high level of audit quality. Results are consistent with this hypothesis. Non- 
Big 4 private firm clients in the UK have lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals, 
better accrual quality, lower ratios of absolute total accruals to absolute CFO, and higher 
likelihood to receive a qualified auditor opinion. Furthermore, there is no difference in the 
level of earnings smoothness between Big 4 and non- Big 4 clients. 
 This paper contributes to the literature primarily by being one of the first to provide 
evidence of a negative relation between auditor size and audit quality in the absence of 
strong incentives by Big 4 auditors to retain their audit quality advantage. Furthermore, to 
the extent that the otherwise positive link between auditor size and audit quality reverses 
when reputation, litigation, and regulatory oversight considerations become sufficiently 
weak, this paper places their moderating role in a relative perspective over the alternative 
explanations of the Big 4 audit quality advantage. I caution that the private firm setting on 
which this study is based is unique in that private firm clients differ from public firm 
clients. Therefore, the extent to which the findings of this study generalize to non- private 
firm settings where Big 4 auditors have considerably weak incentives to deliver high 
quality audits remains an open empirical question. 
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Appendix B 
Panel A: Dependent Variables 
ADA The level of absolute discretionary accruals as in 
Kothari et al. (2005).     
AQ  The Dechow and Dichev (2002) accrual quality 
measure modified by McNichols (2002). 
TACFO The ratio of absolute total accruals to absolute 
cash flow from operations. 
Smooth The ratio of the 3- year standard deviation of 
operating income to the 3- year standard 
deviation of cash flow from operations.  
Opin An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm has received a qualified auditor opinion 
in a specific fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  
  
Panel B: Test Variables 
B4 An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
a firm is audited by a Big 4 auditor in a specific 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise.   
  
Large_NB4  An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
a firm is audited by a non- Big 4 auditors that is 
larger than the median non- Big 4 auditor, and 
zero otherwise. 
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Panel C: Control Variables 
LnToas The natural logarithm of total assets. 
ROA The ratio of net income to lagged total assets.  
Leverage The ratio of total debt to lagged total assets. 
Current Ratio The ratio of current assets to current liabilities. 
Growth The percentage change in sales relative to the 
previous fiscal year. 
Loss An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm reports negative income in a specific 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  
Z- Score Altman’s Z- Score calculated as 1.2* (Net 
Working Capital/Total Assets) + 1.4* (Retained 
Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3* (EBIT/Total 
Assets) + 0.6* (Book Value of Equity/Book 
Value of Total Liabilities) + Sales/Total Assets. 
Lagged Loss An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm reports negative income in the previous 
fiscal year, and zero otherwise. 
Lagged Opin An indicator variable that takes the value of 1 if 
the firm has received a qualified auditor opinion 
in the previous fiscal year, and zero otherwise.  
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Chapter 4

 
 
Big 4 Office Political Connections and Client Restatements 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Audit firms devote significant amounts of funds to establishing political 
connections. Reuters reports that Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers spent a combined $9.4 million on in-house and outside lobbyists 
in 2011. In addition, political action committees (PACs) funded mainly by the firms' 
employees contributed more to congressional campaigns in the 2010 election cycle than 
they had in at least a decade
1
. Auditors utilize their political connections in order to 
influence regulators or legislators for their own benefit as well as for the benefit of their 
clients (Watts and Zimmerman 1982; Puro 1984). It is not clear, however, what the audit 
quality consequences of auditor political connections are. Although prior literature 
generally concludes that politically connected firms exhibit lower accounting quality and 
are less likely to be targeted by disciplinary agencies (Chaney et al. 2011; Yu and Yu 
2011; Correia 2014), there is a paucity of evidence with respect to the relation between 
auditor political connections and audit quality. Burnett et al. (2013) provide a recent 
exception: They examine the link between auditor lobbying on behalf of their own clients 
                                                          

 This chapter is based on Elemes (2015b). I thank my dissertation supervisor, Erik Peek, for his advice and 
support. I would also like to thank Ole- Kristian Hope, Gordon Richardson, Ann Vanstraelen, David Veenman, 
Ping Zhang, as well as seminar participants at Erasmus University Rotterdam, ESSEC Business School, HEC 
Paris, IESEG School of Management, and Rotman School of Management. I have additionally benefited from 
discussions with Stephanie Cheng, Mahfuz Chy, and Wuyang Zhao. This paper was written during my visit at 
Rotman School of Management, University of Toronto. I gratefully acknowledge the financial contribution of 
ERIM, the RSM department of Accounting & Control, and Trustfonds.  
1 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/13/us-usa-accounting-big-idUSBRE82C0JQ20120313 
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and audit quality using auditor PAC data at the national level. However, they do not find 
evidence of audit quality compromise.  
In this paper, I investigate the relation between Big 4 auditor- specific political 
connections and audit quality at the audit office level. I specifically focus on the frequency 
of accounting restatements as it constitutes a more direct measure of low- quality audits 
compared to accrual- based measures (Francis et al. 2013) and strongly suggestive that the 
original audit of the misstated financial statement was of low quality (Kinney et al. 2004; 
Palmrose and Scholz 2004; Francis and Michas 2013). To construct my office- level 
measures of auditor political connections, I manually retrieve the PAC contributions of all 
Big 4 employees in the US targeting members of committees responsible for auditor 
regulation and oversight, i.e., the Senate committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban 
Affairs and the House of Representatives committee on Financial Services. Through this 
procedure, I create a sample of office- specific, long- term political connections that spans 
from 2003 to 2012. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to investigate the audit quality 
consequences of auditor political connections at the audit office level.  
Economists such as Stigler (1971) and Peltzman (1976) have long argued that 
interest groups provide political support to regulators in exchange for wealth transfers. The 
political support offered can take the form of either money or votes. Eventually regulators 
become captured by their supporting groups, which often enjoy preferential treatment over 
other groups or rivals. Therefore, to the extent that political connections allow firms to 
enjoy preferential treatment, auditor political connections could result in them being less 
scrutinized by regulatory and disciplinary agencies. Consequently, politically connected 
audit offices would be less likely to provide high quality audits. 
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Interest groups utilize their political connections in order to influence regulators to 
their benefit. Regulators, however, also stand to benefit from establishing political 
connections by gaining access to information related to the political as well as policy 
consequences of their regulatory plans and actions (Aplin and Hegarty 1980; Gilligan and 
Krehbiel 1989; Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hall and Deardorff 
2006). Regulators therefore place great emphasis on the credibility and reputation of the 
source (Heinz et al. 1993; Hull 1993; Hillman and Hitt 1999). In addition, political science 
literature suggests that interest groups establish long- term relations with their affiliated 
politicians by developing implicit non- enforceable contracts that rely on trust and 
reputation (Snyder 1992; Mccarty and Rothenberg 1996; Berry 1999; Bernhagen 2013). 
Politically connected auditors could therefore have increased reputation and litigation 
considerations since an audit failure could adversely affect their trustworthiness and, 
consequently, put their relations with their affiliated politicians at risk. 
Political connections yield informational advantages to auditors as well. Social 
capital theory predicts that economic agents that are part of a network gain informational 
advantages from their network connections and position (Coleman 1988; Burt 1992; 
Horton and Serafeim 2012; Cohen et al. 2010; Horton et al. 2014). Politically connected 
auditors are part of a network that includes regulators as well as other auditors who are 
also politically connected. Furthermore, politically connected auditors are deeply involved 
in the standard- setting procedure and engage in discussions with regulators about issues 
that relate to audit practice  (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Watts and Zimmerman 1982; 
Puro 1984; Roberts et al. 2003; Dwyer and Roberts 2004; Thornburg and Roberts 2008). 
79
 
 
They therefore could also be more successful in understanding and applying accounting 
standards as well as identifying areas that need attention early on.  
In line with these predictions, I find that clients of politically connected offices are 
less likely to restate their financial statements. The results are highly statistically 
significant and robust across three alternative measures of audit office political 
connectedness. Furthermore, the negative relation between office- level political 
connectedness and restatement frequency is incremental to and distinct from the relation 
between firm- specific political connections and restatement frequency. Overall, these 
findings suggest that, auditor- specific political connections accrue audit quality benefits to 
clients of politically connected offices. 
One might argue that, for audit engagements with clients that are politically 
connected themselves, auditor reputation and litigation considerations may not be 
sufficient to deter audit quality impairment. To the extent that politically connected firms 
are less likely to be targeted by regulatory agencies, politically connected auditors could 
perceive these clients as being of lower risk. It follows that under this scenario, politically 
connected offices would have fewer incentives to offer high quality audits to politically 
connected clients and would therefore be more likely to restate their earnings later on. At 
the extreme, auditors could even lobby on behalf of their clients as was the case with Ernst 
& Young which was convicted by the SEC because it had ongoing lobbying contracts with 
companies it also audited2. Apart from the lobbying contracts with their auditor, these 
clients had established their own firm- specific political connections. Therefore, when both 
                                                            
2 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/14/us-sec-ernst-young-violations-idUSKBN0FJ2AF20140714 
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auditors and clients are politically connected, the risk of an audit quality compromise could 
be even greater.  
To investigate this hypothesis, I interact my auditor political connectedness 
measures with a firm- specific indicator of long- term political connectedness. Consistent 
with my expectations, I find that the relation between audit office political connectedness 
and restatement frequency is less negative for politically connected clients. That is, the 
audit quality benefits that result from the political connections of auditors do not appear to 
persist for politically connected clients. 
Variation in restatement frequency may not always reflect variation in audit quality. 
While the lower rate of restatements can represent absence of errors or irregularities, it 
could also be the result of lower enforcement (Srinivasan et al. 2014; Correia 2014). I 
therefore run several tests to mitigate concerns that lower enforcement accounts for my 
results. First, I perform a placebo test in which I examine the relation between auditor 
political connectedness and restatement frequency focusing this time on the restatement 
announcement year rather than the manipulation year. To the extent that politically 
connected auditors are subject to favorable treatment by disciplinary and regulatory 
agencies, the negative relation between auditor political connections and client restatement 
frequency should persist under this specification as well. That is, the likelihood of 
restatement detection and disclosure will be lower when auditors are politically connected. 
I find no empirical evidence in support of this argument. The variables of interest, i.e., my 
measures of audit office political connectedness, are insignificant in all tests. In contrast to 
the office- specific results, the relation between firm- specific political connections and 
restatement frequency remains negative and statistically significant under this alternative 
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specification, consistent with the argument that politically connected firms are less likely 
to be targeted by the SEC and are thus subject to lower enforcement (Correia 2014). 
I next examine whether the relation between internal control material weaknesses 
(ICW) and the rate of restatements is conditional on the level of the political connections 
of auditors. Following Srinivasan et al. (2014), I expect variation in this relation to reflect 
variation in the quality of detection and disclosure. I find no evidence that the relation 
between ICW and restatement frequency varies with auditors’ political connections for 
non- politically connected firms. Interestingly, however, I do provide some evidence that 
this relation is less positive for politically connected clients. That is, for politically 
connected clients, not only is the frequency of restatements greater, but the association of 
the rate of restatements with ICW is weaker as well. 
Finally, to test the robustness of my findings, I investigate whether the negative 
relation between audit office political connectedness and client restatement frequency is 
the result of politically connected offices having a less risky clientele base. I therefore 
create a propensity score- matched sample in which one observation with above median 
value of audit office political connectedness is matched with an observation with below 
median value of audit office political connectedness. I perform the matching separately for 
each measure of audit office political connectedness and based on firm- specific 
characteristics that account for innate clientele restatement risk. The results of this analysis 
are consistent with original findings. 
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. Prior empirical research has 
mainly focused on the consequences of the political connections of firms (Faccio 2006; 
Faccio 2010; Chaney et al. 2011; Yu and Yu 2011; Blau et al. 2013; Skaife et al. 2013; 
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Correia 2014). To my knowledge, this is one of the few empirical studies to investigate the 
audit quality consequences of the political connections of auditors and the first to examine 
the relation between auditor political connections and audit quality at the audit office level. 
Second, by providing evidence of a negative relation between auditor political 
connections and client restatement frequency, I show that the political connections of 
auditors accrue audit quality benefits to their clients.  This effect is distinct from the 
relation between the political connections firms and accounting quality and appears to be 
driven by different underlying factors. That is, the negative link between audit office 
political connections and restatement frequency reflects superior audit quality rather than 
lower detection or disclosure. 
Third, the current study contributes to the literature on the determinants of audit 
quality at the audit office level. Francis and Yu (2009), Choi et al. (2010), and Francis et 
al. (2013) reason that audit office size is a determinant of superior audit quality. 
Furthermore, Reichelt and Wang (2010) find that there is a positive link between audit 
office industry expertise and audit quality. I argue that politically connected audit offices 
are more likely to deliver superior audit quality and this effect is incremental to that of 
previously defined office- level characteristics. 
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature that investigates threats to auditor 
independence. For example, prior research has identified auditor tenure, as well as the joint 
provision of audit and non- audit services as potential threats to auditor independence. My 
findings suggest that politically connected clients are more likely to restate their financial 
statements when they are being audited by politically connected offices. I therefore argue 
that the threat of audit quality compromise is greater when both clients and auditors are 
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politically connected since, from an auditor’s perspective, the perceived cost of an audit 
failure is lower. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I review the 
related literature and develop the hypotheses. Section 3 presents the empirical models. In 
section 4, I describe the sample selection process and offer descriptive statistics, while in 
section 5, I present the empirical results and additional robustness tests. Section 6 
concludes. 
4.2 Background and Hypothesis Development 
“Republican Representative Spencer Bachus, chairman of the House Financial 
Services Committee which oversees the PCAOB, has been a leading beneficiary of 
donations from Big Four executives. He has accepted $370,000 in contributions from 
people in the accounting and audit industry in his career, more than any other current 
House member.” 
 Research in political science generally concludes that firms use PAC contributions 
to buy access to influential politicians and political favors (Snyder 1990; Snyder 1992; 
Snyder 1993; Kroszner and Stratmann 1998; Milyo et al. 2000). This argument represents 
the main principle of exchange theories (McConnell 1966; Lowi 1969; Morton and 
Cameron 1992; Hillman and Hitt 1999; Hall and Deardorff 2006) which interpret lobbying 
as an exchange of money and votes for political favors. Stigler’s capture theory draws 
upon exchange theories and purports that interest groups capture regulators in their attempt 
to shape law and regulations to their own favor. Recent evidence in accounting and finance 
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seems to confirm capture theory. For example, Yu and Yu (2011) find that politically 
connected firms are more likely to avoid fraud detection. Moreover, Correia (2014) finds 
that politically connected firms are less likely to be targeted by the SEC and conditional on 
being targeted, they pay lower penalties. In addition, politically connected firms exhibit 
lower accounting quality (Chaney et al. 2011; Correia 2014). These findings gain 
additional support in the argument that the SEC is resource- constrained and conducts 
investigations based on preferences and political influence (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011; 
Correia 2014).  
Auditors use their political connections to lobby for their own interests as well for 
the interests of their clients. Through their political connections, auditors exercise 
influence on regulators and shape the standard- setting process to their own benefit. For 
example, Watts and Zimmerman (1978, 1982) and Puro (1984) argue that auditors lobby 
standard- setting agencies, such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board, for the 
introduction of new standards or the amendment of existing standards. Other studies show 
how audit firms use PAC contributions to gain access to politicians and influence 
regulatory changes regarding audit practice, such as the Private Securities Ligation Reform 
Act of 1995 and the Sarbanes- Oxley Act of 2002 (Roberts et al. 2003; Dwyer and Roberts 
2004; Thornburg and Roberts 2008). Two congressional committees are mainly 
responsible for auditor regulation and oversight by the SEC and the PCAOB: The Senate 
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs Committee and the House of Representatives 
Committee on Financial Services. Using PAC contributions, Big 4 auditors have strongly 
supported members from both committees over the past years. Therefore, one might argue 
that, under the premises of capture theory, politically connected Big 4 auditors are able to 
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capture politicians and extract benefits in the form of lower disciplinary enforcement 
against them or their clients. For example, clients of politically connected auditors could 
be less likely to be audited by the SEC or conditional on a client being involved in an SEC 
enforcement action, politically connected auditors could be less likely to be penalized by 
the SEC. Under this scenario, connected auditors would have fewer incentives to offer 
high quality audit services. A recent study from China provides evidence consistent with 
the argument of regulatory capture by politically connected auditors when they participate 
in the regulatory decision-making process (Yang 2013). 
While exchange theories view lobbying as an exchange of money and votes for 
political favors, persuasion theories focus on the information value of interest groups to 
regulators. These theories draw on the information asymmetry between legislators and 
interest groups to justify the existence of lobbying (Hansen 1991; Austen-Smith 1993; 
Austen-Smith and Wright 1994; Austen-Smith 1995; Naoi and Krauss 2009; Holyoke 
2009). Regulators have limited resources in terms of time, labor, and information to 
address all issues on which they want to be involved (Hall and Deardorff 2006). Since 
interest groups are specialists in their area, regulators rely on them to acquire specialized 
information and assess the political and policy consequences of their actions (Aplin and 
Hegarty 1980; Gilligan and Krehbiel 1989; Austen-Smith and Wright 1992; Hillman and 
Hitt 1999; Hall and Deardorff 2006). Therefore, the creditworthiness of the agent of the 
interest group is of great importance to legislators (Heinz et al. 1993; Hull 1993; Hillman 
and Hitt 1999). Such reputation is built through repeated dealing and shapes the long- term 
nature of the interest group- legislator relation. There is little guarantee that either party 
will not renege on its promises as fee- for- service agreements would be considered bribery 
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(Kroszner and Stratmann 2000). In the absence of formal, enforceable contracts, the 
demand for reputable and credible agents is amplified by the implicit non- enforceable 
nature of the agreements on which interest groups and regulators rely. An audit failure 
could severely impair the creditworthiness and status of the involved auditors and thus 
threaten the continuation of their relations with political authorities. Such a breach would 
undermine the ability of the associated accounting firm to influence political authorities 
and standard setting agencies and thus incur an even greater reputation loss and status 
downgrade to the involved auditors. Following these arguments, I reason that politically 
connected auditors have increased reputation and litigation considerations because an audit 
quality failure could compromise their relations with political authorities and incur 
consequences for both the auditor and the associated accounting firm. On a related note, 
Ramanna and Roychowdhury (2010) show that politically connected firms are concerned 
about the preservation of their relation with their affiliated politicians and take actions to 
protect them against political embarrassment.  
The consequences of a potential breach in the political connections of auditors are 
probably even greater when considering the informational benefits that flow from 
politicians to auditors. These benefits allow politically connected auditors to improve their 
audit-related skills and knowledge. They therefore enhance the reputation and litigation 
considerations of politically connected auditors because they increase the value of political 
connections to them. Politically connected auditors are part of a wide network of regulators 
and other politically connected auditors. Through their interaction with these individuals, 
they become further involved in the issues that concern their profession. That is, politically 
connected auditors have access to more peers and regulators with whom they can consult 
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and therefore more opportunities to enhance their competencies, knowledge, and skills. 
Francis and Yu (2009) for instance argue that, one of the reasons why auditors in large 
offices offer superior audit quality is the fact that large offices have greater in-house 
networking and consultation opportunities. These arguments are consistent with the 
premises of social capital theory which predicts that network connections accrue 
informational advantages to members of the network (Coleman 1988; Burt 1992; Horton 
and Serafeim 2012; Cohen et al. 2010; Horton et al. 2014). Network studies have 
repeatedly shown that there is a positive link between social capital and performance. For 
example, Horton et al. (2012) find that firms with better connected directors have better 
future performance. Moreover, Horton and Serafeim (2012) argue that analysts with more 
connections issue more accurate and timely forecasts, while Horton et al. (2014) provide 
evidence that better connected audit partners provide higher quality audits.  
I further argue that politically connected auditors exhibit superior performance 
particularly when it comes to interpreting and correctly applying accounting standards in 
accordance with GAAP. Politically connected auditors are heavily involved in the 
standard- setting procedure (Watts and Zimmerman 1978; Watts and Zimmerman 1982; 
Puro 1984; Roberts et al. 2003; Dwyer and Roberts 2004; Thornburg and Roberts 2008). 
Legislators discuss with auditors about issues that pertain to audit practice and concern the 
correct application of GAAP as well as ways on how to improve existing standards. I 
therefore expect that, compared to non- connected auditors, politically connected auditors 
are more likely to be informed about potential ambiguities surrounding provisions of the 
current standards that require judgement. Furthermore, to the extent that audit firms lobby 
for the introduction of new standards or the amendment of existing standards, politically 
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connected auditors are more likely to have a better understanding of the letter and spirit of 
the new or amended standard due to their participation in the deliberations regarding the 
standard.    
 In this paper, I focus on the audit quality implications of auditor- specific political 
connections of Big 4 auditors at the audit office level. I define auditor- specific political 
connections as those that auditors establish with members of committees responsible for 
auditor regulation and oversight. That is, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban Affairs and the House of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. I 
measure audit quality as the frequency of accounting restatements because the material 
restatement of originally audited financial statements is strongly suggestive that the 
original audit of those financial statements was of low quality (Palmrose and Scholz 2004; 
Kinney et al. 2004; Francis and Michas 2013; Francis et al. 2013). Moreover, the SEC 
describes restatements as “the most visible indicator of improper accounting — and source 
of new investigations” (Schroeder 2001). Restatements can have severe consequences for 
auditors. They trigger SEC disciplinary actions (Dechow et al. 1995; Dechow et al. 2011), 
lawsuits against auditors (Palmrose and Scholz 2004) and may even result in auditor 
resignation or dismissal (Hennes et al. 2014). Due to their visibility and significant 
reputation- damaging effects, I expect restatements to severely affect the connections of 
auditors with their affiliated politicians. Politically connected auditors have therefore even 
stronger incentives to avoid being involved in a restatement. Furthermore, drawing upon 
Plumlee and Yohn (2010) who find that 37% of all restatements are related to the lack of 
clarity in accounting standards and the use of judgement in applying the standards, I argue 
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that the frequency of accounting misstatements is a suitable measure to capture the 
network- related information and knowledge benefits of politically connected auditors. 
Based on these arguments, I formulate my first hypothesis (in alternative format) as 
follows: 
H1: Clients of politically connected offices are less likely to restate their 
earnings. 
Even if, on average, politically connected auditors do not capture regulatory 
authorities, there might still be settings in which auditor political connections account for a 
decrease in audit quality. Audit engagements with politically connected clients probably 
constitute one such setting. Politically connected auditors are more likely to know which 
clients are politically connected themselves. Since politically connected clients are less 
likely to be targeted by disciplinary agencies and are subject to lower enforcement (Chaney 
et al. 2011; Correia 2014), politically connected auditors may perceive these clients as 
being less risky and essentially cater their desire to remain opaque. That is, politically 
connected auditors could exert lower effort for those clients for which enforcement costs 
are lower. Under this scenario, politically connected auditors would be less likely to offer 
high quality audits to politically connected clients. In line with this argument, Gul (2006) 
finds that auditors in Malaysia exert greater effort on politically connected firms when they 
are considered to have lost political support. However, they reduce their effort when their 
clients' political links are re- established.   
What would perhaps pose an even greater threat of audit quality compromise is the 
possibility that auditors utilize their political connections to explicitly lobby on behalf of 
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certain clients. Although auditor lobbying is permissible in the US, auditors are prohibited 
from lobbying on behalf of their clients as such an activity could impair their independence 
and objectivity. The case of Ernst & Young is a notable example: In March 2012, Reuters 
questioned Ernst & Young’s independence in providing audit services citing the lobbying 
contracts that the auditing firm had with a number of its clients3. The SEC investigation 
which was initiated following the article resulted in Ernst & Young receiving a fine of $4 
million in July 2014 for violating auditor independence rules in lobbying activities4. In a 
recent study, Burnett et al. (2013) investigate the extent to which auditors are likely to 
compromise their independence for clients sharing the same political connections as the 
audit firm. Although they fail to find evidence of audit quality impairment, their study is 
limited by the fact that they use auditor PAC data at the national level.  Regardless of 
whether auditors act as lobbying advocates of their clients or not, the likelihood of audit 
quality impairment could still be greater when both clients and auditors are politically 
connected. Alternatively, auditor reputation and litigation considerations could be 
sufficiently high to preclude the possibility of audit quality compromise.  
Based on these arguments, I state my second hypothesis (in alternative format) as 
follows: 
Hypothesis 2:  The relation between the frequency of restatements and audit 
office political connectedness is less negative for politically connected clients. 
 
                                                            
3 http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/09/us-usa-accounting-ernst-idUSBRE82718C20120309 
4 http://www.sec.gov/News/PressRelease/Detail/PressRelease/1370542298984#.VHOGb4vF8jw 
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4.3 Methodology 
4.3.1 Political Connections Measures 
Because interest groups develop long- term relations with affiliated politicians 
(Berry 1989; Snyder 1992; Mccarty and Rothenberg 1996; Bernhagen 2013), I focus on 
long- term measures of audit office political connectedness to capture the relation between 
restatement frequency and audit office political connectedness. Following Cooper et al. 
(2010) and Correia (2014), I define my first measure as the 5-year dollar amount of PACs 
targeting auditor- relevant politicians. I calculate this variable at the audit firm- audit office 
level: 
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 𝟏 = �𝑷𝑷𝑪𝒕−𝟒,𝒕𝑷
𝒑=𝟏
, 
where p=1,…,P is the politician index and ∑ PACt−4,tPp=1  is the dollar amount of PAC 
contributions to auditor- relevant committee members made by all employees of each audit 
firm- office over the previous five years. 
My second measure is the 5-year sum of distinct per year auditor-relevant 
politicians supported by each audit firm- office:  
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 𝟐 = �  𝒕
𝒕−𝟒
�𝟏
𝑷
𝒑=𝟏
, 
where p=1,…,P is the politician index and ∑ 1Pp=1  is the total number of politicians 
supported per audit firm- office- fiscal year. 
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My last measure is the 5-year sum of distinct per year contributors for each audit 
firm- office:  
𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴 𝟑 = �  𝒕
𝒕−𝟒
�𝟏
𝑬
𝑴=𝟏
, 
where e=1,…,E is the politically connected employee index and ∑ 1𝐸𝑒=1  is total number of 
employees making PAC contributions per audit firm- office-fiscal year. 
Because my office- level measures of auditor political connectedness are strongly 
positively correlated with the size of the engagement office which has been identified as a 
determinant of superior audit quality by prior literature (Francis and Yu 2009; Choi et al. 
2010; Francis et al. 2013), I regress the natural logarithm of one plus each of these 
measures on the size of the audit office. My final measures of auditor political 
connectedness are the residuals of each of these regressions5. 
4.3.2 Empirical Models 
To test my first hypothesis, I use the following probit model: 
𝑹𝑴𝑴𝒕𝑴𝒕𝑴𝒊,𝒕 = 𝑴𝟎 + 𝑴𝟏𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴_𝑹𝑴𝑴+ 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝑴𝑪𝑪𝑴+ 𝒀𝑴𝑴𝑴 𝑭𝑬 + 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑴𝑴𝒕𝑴𝑰 𝑭𝑬+ 𝑷𝑴𝑰𝒊𝒕 𝑶𝑶𝑶𝒊𝑶𝑴 𝑭𝑬+ 𝜺𝒊,𝒕   (𝟏), 
where Restatei,t is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a firm- year is subsequently 
restated, and 0 otherwise, whereas Measure_Res is the corresponding orthogonalized 
auditor political connectedness measure. Following Francis et al. (2013), I use 
                                                            
5 Results are qualitatively identical if I use the original measures (rather than the residuals of the regressions on 
office size). In particular, both Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2 are confirmed and the corresponding test variables 
are significant at the 1% level. 
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heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors, clustered at the office- year- 
audit firm level.  
Control Variables 
I control for firm- specific long- term PAC contributions (5y Firm PACs) to account 
for the degree of firm- specific political connectedness. I define this variable as the natural 
logarithm of one plus the 5-year sum of all dollar PAC contributions made by firm i over 
the past five years. Following Francis and Yu (2009), Choi et al. (2010), and Francis et al. 
(2013), I control for the size of the engagement office (Office Size). I define this variable as 
the natural logarithm of the audit fees of all clients of the office minus the audit fees of the 
corresponding client6. I control for firm size (Total Assets) calculated as the natural 
logarithm of total assets although most prior studies find no relation between size and 
restatements  (Cao et al. 2012). I include market- to- book ratio (Market- to- Book) as a 
control for firm growth. I control for leverage (Leverage) motivated by the debt covenant 
hypothesis (Watts and Zimmerman 1986). I calculate this variable as the ratio of long- 
term debt divided by total assets. I control for profitability (ROA) and firms that report 
losses (Loss) to capture the link between firm performance and misstatement frequency. I 
further control for firm complexity by including the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of business (Num. of Business Segments) and geographic segments (Num. of 
Geographic Segments). Moreover, I include an indicator variable for mergers and 
acquisitions (Merger), as well as for new financing activities (Financing) following prior 
literature (Dechow 1996; Palmrose and Scholz 2004). In a second step, I augment this 
model with four additional controls: the proportion of assets in receivables and inventory 
                                                            
6 I follow prior literature and calculate office size prior to merging with Compustat. 
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(Receivables & Inventory) (Feroz et al. 1991; Summers and Sweeney 1998), the standard 
deviation of ROA (Std ROA) to control for operational volatility (Cao et al. 2012), as well 
as indicators for industry expertise at the city and national level (City Leader, National 
Leader) following Francis et al. (2013). In both specifications, I include industry, year, and 
audit firm fixed effects. I estimate industry fixed effects using 2-digit SIC codes. Finally, I 
winsorize all continuous, non- logarithmic variables at the 1% and 99% levels. Detailed 
definitions of all variables can be found in Appendix C.  
To test my second hypothesis, I replace the dollar- based firm- specific measure of 
political connectedness with an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the firm has 
made PAC contributions over the past five years, and 0 otherwise. I subsequently estimate 
the following probit model: 
𝑹𝑴𝑴𝒕𝑴𝒕𝑴𝒊,𝒕 = 𝑴𝟎 + 𝑴𝟏𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴_𝑹𝑴𝑴+ 𝑴𝟐𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴_𝑹𝑴𝑴 𝑿 𝟓𝑰 𝑭𝒊𝑴𝑭 𝑷𝑷𝑪 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒊𝑶𝑴𝒕𝑪𝑴𝒊,𝒕+ 𝑴𝟑𝟓𝑰 𝑭𝒊𝑴𝑭 𝑷𝑷𝑪 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒊𝑶𝑴𝒕𝑪𝑴𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝑴𝑪𝑪𝑴 + 𝒀𝑴𝑴𝑴 𝑭𝑬+ 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑴𝑴𝒕𝑴𝑰 𝑭𝑬 + 𝑷𝑴𝑰𝒊𝒕 𝑶𝑶𝑶𝒊𝑶𝑴 𝑭𝑬 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕  (𝟐) 
Controls are defined as previously. Due to the difficulties in interpreting interaction 
terms in probit specifications (Ai and Norton 2003; Cornelli et al. 2013), as a robustness 
check, I repeat all regressions with interaction terms using OLS estimation techniques.  
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4.4 Data  
4.4.1 Audit Office Political Connections Data 
To construct my office- level measures of political connectedness, I obtain PAC 
contribution data originating from individuals from the Center for Responsive Politics 
(CRP) for the period 1999-20127. In particular, I use the “Individual Contributions” file 
from the Campaign Finance Database and manually match the name of each Big 4 audit 
firm to the corresponding employer field8. I additionally retrieve location information 
including the city, address, and zip code of all contributors and use this data to match each 
contributor to the corresponding local engagement office. My source of data for the list of 
all local Big 4 audit engagement offices is Audit Analytics. If the city of the contributor 
cannot be matched, I use the available zip code and require a maximum distance of 10 
miles from the closest local office. I further filter out those PAC contributions that do not 
directly target individual candidates and use Charles Stewart's Congressional Data Page to 
identify those PACs supporting auditor- relevant politicians9. That is, I focus on PACs to 
members of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the House 
of Representatives Committee on Financial Services. Because Charles Stewart's database 
has not been updated to the 112th Congress yet, for years 2011 and 2012 I retrieve the 
related committee assignments from the official committee websites. Through this 
procedure, I am able to identify 225 unique Big 4 offices with at least one PAC 
contribution to auditor- relevant politicians during the period 1999- 2012. I present 
                                                            
7 http://www.opensecrets.org/ 
8 Manually matching is required by the fact that CRP provides no single standardized name for the employment 
firm of individual contributors. Instead, multiple alternatives names correspond to each employment firm.   
9 http://web.mit.edu/17.251/www/data_page.html#2 
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descriptive statistics of this sample in Table 4.1 before merging with Compustat and 
imposing further data restrictions.  
 
Audit Firm Number of Politically Connected Offices
Total Number of Offices 
in Audit Analytics
% Politically 
Connected Offices 
Ernst & Young 60 104 57.69%
Deloitte 52 92 56.52%
KPMG 57 97 58.76%
PwC 56 96 58.33%
Audit Firm Aggregate $ PACs Number of  Supported Politicians 
Number of Politically 
Connected Employees  
Ernst & Young 650,099 129 565
Deloitte 812,833 113 641
KPMG 289,256 78 308
PwC 466,317 98 481
Audit Firm Number of Politically Connected Employees  
Number of Total 
Employees (2013)
% Politically 
Connected Employees
Ernst & Young 565 30,900 1.83%
Deloitte 641 60,951 1.05%
KPMG 308 24,618 1.25%
PwC 481 39,158 1.23%
This table presents the Big 4 employee- political connectedness descriprives statistics at the audit firm
level for the period 1999- 2012. Panel A shows the number of politically connected offices per audit
firm in absolute numbers as well as as a percentage of the total number of engagement offices for each
audit firm. An engagement office is classified as politically connected if at least one employee of that
office makes PAC contributions to support auditor- relevant politicians during the period 1999-2012.
Panel B presents three aggregate measures of audit firm employee political connectedness: the sum of
dollar PACs targeting auditor- relevant politicians, the number of distinct auditor- relevant politicians
supported, as well as the number of distinct employees identified as PAC contributors over the same 14-
year period. Panel C offers descriptive statistics regarding the percentage of politically connected
employees to the number of total employees for each audit firm. The number of total employees is
obtained from www.statista.com and corresponds to US employees of Big 4 audit firms in year 2013.
TABLE 4.1
Panel A: Number of Politically Connected Offices per Big 4 Audit Firm
Panel B: Aggregate Measures of Audit Firm Employee Political Connectedness 
Panel C: Percentage of Connected Employees to the Number of Total Employees per Big 4 Audit Firm
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Table 4.1, Panel A shows the number of politically connected offices per audit firm 
for the years 1999-2012. I classify an office as politically connected if at least one 
employee of that office makes an auditor- relevant PAC contribution during this period. 
Ernst & Young has the largest number of politically connected offices with 60 distinct 
offices that have supported at least one auditor- relevant politician during the sample 
period. Deloitte has the fewest politically connected offices (52), whereas KPMG and PwC 
rank in the middle with 57 and 56 connected offices respectively. Perhaps with the 
exception of Deloitte, these numbers do not seem to indicate significant absolute 
differences among audit firms. When comparing the number of politically connected 
offices with the total number of all offices reported in Audit Analytics for the same period 
(1999- 2012), these differences become even smaller10.  In relative terms, all Big 4 audit 
firms have roughly the same percentage of politically connected to total number of offices 
with the difference between the first (KPMG) and the last (Deloitte) being roughly 2.2 
percentage points. 
Panel B presents aggregate values of three alternative measures of audit firm 
employee political connectedness calculated at the audit firm level over the period 1999-
2012: the dollar amount of PACs, the number of supported auditor- relevant politicians, 
and the number of politically connected employees. Upon initial review, this panel seems 
to indicate that there are important differences in the degree of audit employee political 
connectedness among Big 4 audit firms. For example, Deloitte ranks first in two out of 
three measures and second in the third with 641 politically connected employees and more 
than $812 thousand spent on 113 auditor- relevant politicians. KPMG on the other hand, 
                                                            
10 This comparison is based on the number of Big 4 audit offices reported in Audit Analytics with at least one 
firm that can be matched with Compustat. 
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ranks last in all measures: From 1999 to 2012, 308 KPMG employees supported 78 
distinct politicians with PAC contributions that amount to roughly $289 thousand. 
Furthermore, both Ernst & Young and PwC are significantly different from each other, as 
well as from the other two Big 4 audit firms, in terms of total amount spent on PACs, 
number of supported politicians, and number of connected employees. Given the PAC 
contribution limits for individuals11, these differences could simply reflect differences in 
the total number of employees per audit firm. To investigate whether this is the case, I 
retrieve data on the total number of employees of Big 4 audit firms in the US from 
www.statista.com and present this data in Table 4.1, Panel C12. Indeed, Panel C shows that 
the differences in Panel B are largely due the underlying differences in the number of total 
employees among Big 4 audit firms. Politically connected employees in Deloitte represent 
1.05% of the total number of employees, whereas the corresponding percentages for 
KPMG and PwC are 1.25% and 1.23% respectively. Ernst & Young still stands out with 
1.83% of politically connected employees.  
4.4.2 Main Sample Data   
I define my sample period from 2003 to 2012 and thus I allow enough office- year 
observations to construct my 5-year auditor political connectedness measures. I retrieve 
auditor and restatement data from Audit Analytics. I drop restatements that occur due to 
clerical errors, quarterly restatements, as well restatements with positive impact on 
earnings. Moreover,  I  restrict  my  sample to clients which  are headquartered  and  
                                                            
11 For example, for the 2014 cycle, individuals were allowed to give up to $2,600 to each candidate or candidate 
committee. 
12 I use audit firm employee data from www.statista.com for the year 2013, since there are no earlier records of 
this type of data readily available.    
99
 
 
 
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75
$ PACs 574 2,711 4,241 500 1,000 3,000
Number of Politicians 574 1.68 1.61 1 1 2
Number of Contributors 574 3.43 4.82 1 2 4
Number of Unique Offices 176
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Measure 1 1,246 5,933 10,946 1,000 2,000 5,900
Measure 2 1,246 3.69 4.98 1 2 4
Measure 3 1,246 7.61 12.81 1 3 7
Number of Unique Offices 202
Variable N Mean SD P25 Median P75
Restate 17,330 0.13 0.34 0 0 0
Measure 1_Res 17,330 0.05 3.17 -2.26 0.71 2.19
Measure 2_Res 17,330 0 0.71 -0.51 -0.07 0.46
Measure 3_Res 17,330 0 0.95 -0.68 -0.09 0.61
5y Firm PACs 17,330 2.02 4.42 0 0 0
5y Firm PAC Indicator 17,330 0.18 0.38 0 0 0
Office Size 17,330 17.36 1.88 16.66 17.65 18.38
Total Assets 17,330 6.59 1.78 5.39 6.57 7.75
Market- to- Book 17,330 2.73 3.95 1.28 2.04 3.36
Leverage 17,330 0.2 0.25 0 0.14 0.31
ROA 17,330 0.01 0.19 -0.01 0.04 0.09
Loss 17,330 0.29 0.45 0 0 1
Num. of Bus. Segments 17,330 0.76 0.75 0 0.69 1.39
Num. of Geog. Segments 17,330 0.91 0.73 0 0.69 1.39
Merger 17,330 0.47 0.5 0 0 1
Financing 17,330 0.24 0.43 0 0 0
Receivables & Inventory 17,330 0.28 0.2 0.13 0.25 0.39
Std ROA 17,330 0.12 0.23 0.02 0.05 0.11
City Leader 17,330 0.66 0.47 0 1 1
National Leader 17,330 0.3 0.46 0 0 1
ICW 13,306 0.06 0.23 0 0 0
This table presents descriptive statistics for the period 2003- 2012 (full model). Panel A shows current- 
year only office- level political connectedness descriptive statistics. Panel B presents office- year
statistics of the long- term political connectedness measures in raw format. Panel C reports firm- year
statistics of all regression inputs for the sample period. See Appendix for variable definitions.
TABLE 4.2
Panel A: Office-Year Descriptive Statistics of  Current- Year PAC Contributions Only
Panel C: Full Model Descriptive Statistics
Panel B: Office- Year Descriptive Statistics of Long- Term Political Connectedness Measures 
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incorporated in the US and are audited by US Big 4 practice offices. I additionally drop 
firm- year observations when an auditor switch occurs during the fiscal year. I merge this 
database with Compustat as well as with the audit office political connectedness dataset 
from the previous step. To identify firms that have made PAC contributions in the past, I 
use firm PAC data from the CRP. I follow Correia (2014) and match this database to 
Compustat manually by name. Finally, I drop observations with missing values in the 
variables of interest. These restrictions result in a sample of 17,330 firm- year observations 
and 3,275 firms for the model that includes all controls (full model). Restated firm- years 
amount to roughly 13% of the sample. Table 4.2 presents political connectedness 
descriptive statistics at the office- year level as well descriptive statistics of all regression 
inputs for the full model. 
4.5 Results 
4.5.1 Auditor Political Connections  
Table 4.3, Panel A presents the probit estimations of the regression of restatement 
frequency on each of the three alternative office- specific, long- term measures of political 
connectedness after only including industry, year, and audit firm fixed effects. In a 
separate regression, I additionally control for client long- term political connections. This 
specification results in a sample of 24,694 firm- year observations and 4,344 firms. In the 
first column of each measure, I present the results of the regression without controlling for 
firm political connections, whereas in the second column I additionally include the related 
firm- specific control. Panel A shows that all three measures are negative and statistically 
significant at the 1% level. The coefficients of each measure for the specifications without 
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controlling for firm political connections are -0.0127,   -0.0720, and -0.0473 respectively. 
Moreover, results displayed in column 2 show that this effect persists and is incremental to 
the relation between client political connections and restatement frequency when including 
the related additional control. There is a negative relation between long- term firm political 
connections and the likelihood of accounting restatements and this effect is significant at 
the 1% level across all three alternative measures. This finding is consistent with Correia 
(2014) who argues that politically connected firms are subject to lower enforcement and 
are less likely to be targeted by the SEC. 
 
In Table 4.3, Panel B, I present the results of the main and full model. The inclusion 
of control variables reduces the sample size to 18,593 firm- year observations for the main 
and 17,330 observations for the full model. Despite the inclusion of additional controls, the  
Variables
Measure_Res -0.0127*** -0.0126*** -0.0720*** -0.0713*** -0.0473*** -0.0468***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
5y Firm PACs - -0.0083*** - -0.0082*** - -0.0082***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Constant -1.1611*** -1.1378*** -1.1520*** -1.1291*** -1.1579*** -1.1350***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Fixed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Audit Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls No No No No No No
Observations 24,694 24,694 24,694 24,694 24,694 24,694
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0545 0.0550 0.0549 0.0554 0.0547 0.0552
TABLE 4.3
Likelihood of Accounting Restatements
Measure 1_Res Measure 2_Res Measure 3_Res
Panel A: Regression of Restatements on Audit Office Political Connectedness Without Controls
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Variables
Measure_Res -0.0139*** -0.0122*** -0.0814*** -0.0736*** -0.0549*** -0.0466***
(0.001) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002)
5y Firm PACs -0.0128*** -0.0148*** -0.0128*** -0.0147*** -0.0127*** -0.0147***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Office Size -0.0181*** -0.0163** -0.0191*** -0.0172*** -0.0192*** -0.0172***
(0.003) (0.011) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.007)
Total Assets 0.0151 0.0180* 0.0151 0.0181* 0.0151 0.0180*
(0.143) (0.097) (0.142) (0.096) (0.143) (0.098)
Market-to- Book -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0028 -0.0028
(0.375) (0.401) (0.370) (0.401) (0.374) (0.404)
Leverage 0.1440*** 0.1006* 0.1449*** 0.1020* 0.1452*** 0.1024*
(0.005) (0.073) (0.005) (0.070) (0.005) (0.068)
ROA -0.0304 -0.0345 -0.0300 -0.0355 -0.0301 -0.0349
(0.718) (0.705) (0.722) (0.697) (0.721) (0.702)
Loss 0.1200*** 0.1192*** 0.1185*** 0.1179*** 0.1188*** 0.1181***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Num. of Bus. Seg. 0.0771*** 0.0653*** 0.0786*** 0.0666*** 0.0784*** 0.0664***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Num. of Geog. Seg. 0.0598*** 0.0647*** 0.0583*** 0.0632*** 0.0584*** 0.0634***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Merger 0.0430 0.0409 0.0431 0.0409 0.0427 0.0406
(0.187) (0.226) (0.185) (0.226) (0.190) (0.229)
Financing 0.0655** 0.0738** 0.0650** 0.0734** 0.0650** 0.0735**
(0.046) (0.031) (0.047) (0.032) (0.047) (0.032)
Rec. & Inv. - 0.1430* - 0.1466* - 0.1437*
(0.083) (0.075) (0.082)
Std ROA - 0.0054 - 0.0035 - 0.0040
(0.923) (0.951) (0.944)
City Leader - 0.0058 - 0.0054 - 0.0065
(0.845) (0.855) (0.825)
National Leader - 0.0372 - 0.0402 - 0.0389
(0.189) (0.156) (0.170)
Constant -1.0094*** -1.0631*** -0.9841*** -1.0409*** -0.9879*** -1.0458***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Fixed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Audit Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,593 17,330 18,593 17,330 18,593 17,330
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0629 0.0659 0.0635 0.0664 0.0632 0.0661
TABLE 4.3
Panel B: Regression of  Restatements on Audit Office Political Connectedness With Controls
Measure 1_Res
Likelihood of Accounting Restatements
Measure 2_Res Measure 3_Res
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negative relation between audit office political connections and rate of restatements holds 
and remains highly statistically significant at the 1% level across all specifications. In 
addition, all significant control variables have the predicted sign. Overall, these findings 
seem to suggest that politically connected offices deliver superior audit quality in terms of 
the restatement frequency of their clients. 
4.5.2 Auditor- Client Political Connections 
In table 4.4, I present the results of regression (2) in which I test whether politically 
connected offices are more likely to offer lower quality audits for politically connected 
clients. Consistent with expectations, I find that the relation between audit office political 
connections and restatement frequency is less negative for clients that have made PAC 
contributions to politicians over the past 5 years. In particular, the coefficient of the 
interaction term between Measure 1 and the firm political connectedness indicator is equal 
to 0.0204 (p-value 0.047) for the main model and 0.0278 (p-value 0.008) for the full 
model. For the second measure, the interaction term coefficients are 0.1154 (p-value 
0.012) and 0.1467 (p-value 0.002) respectively, whereas for Measure 3 the corresponding 
coefficients are 0.0849 (p-value 0.011) and 0.1051 (p-value 0.002). These findings indicate 
1% and 5% significance levels for the related interaction terms, depending on the 
specification. Moreover,  both main effects retain  their sign and  significance compared  to  
This table presents the probit regression results of restatement frequency on the three alternative
measures of audit office political connectedness for the period 2003- 2012. Panel A presents the
results of the regressions without controls as well as after controling only for firm political
connections. Panel B presents the results of the regressions after including controls in two
alternative model specifications: the main model (first column of each measure) and the full model
(second column). See Appendix for variable definitions. P-values are in parentheses. *, **, and ***
indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
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Variables
Measure_Res -0.0172*** -0.0168*** -0.1000*** -0.0980*** -0.0690*** -0.0646***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Interaction 0.0204** 0.0278*** 0.1154** 0.1467*** 0.0849** 0.1051***
(0.047) (0.008) (0.012) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002)
5y Firm PAC Ind. -0.1205*** -0.1434*** -0.1196*** -0.1423*** -0.1196*** -0.1429***
(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Office Size -0.0180*** -0.0162** -0.0191*** -0.0174*** -0.0192*** -0.0173***
(0.003) (0.012) (0.002) (0.007) (0.002) (0.007)
Total Assets 0.0110 0.0133 0.0112 0.0136 0.0110 0.0134
(0.277) (0.212) (0.272) (0.204) (0.276) (0.209)
Market-to- Book -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029 -0.0029
(0.362) (0.393) (0.358) (0.395) (0.355) (0.385)
Leverage 0.1478*** 0.1052* 0.1487*** 0.1063* 0.1487*** 0.1063*
(0.004) (0.061) (0.004) (0.059) (0.004) (0.059)
ROA -0.0252 -0.0283 -0.0249 -0.0297 -0.0247 -0.0285
(0.764) (0.756) (0.768) (0.745) (0.770) (0.755)
Loss 0.1201*** 0.1193*** 0.1188*** 0.1185*** 0.1197*** 0.1193***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Num. of Bus. Seg. 0.0761*** 0.0641*** 0.0776*** 0.0656*** 0.0771*** 0.0649***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
Num. of Geog. Seg. 0.0603*** 0.0655*** 0.0588*** 0.0639*** 0.0588*** 0.0641***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Merger 0.0433 0.0411 0.0431 0.0409 0.0422 0.0401
(0.184) (0.224) (0.186) (0.226) (0.196) (0.235)
Financing 0.0666** 0.0755** 0.0663** 0.0753** 0.0662** 0.0753**
(0.042) (0.027) (0.044) (0.028) (0.044) (0.028)
Rec. & Inv. - 0.1373* - 0.1421* - 0.1391*
(0.096) (0.085) (0.092)
Std ROA - 0.0036 - 0.0015 - 0.0026
(0.949) (0.979) (0.963)
City Leader - 0.0053 - 0.0045 - 0.0060
(0.858) (0.879) (0.839)
National Leader - 0.0372 - 0.0394 - 0.0380
(0.190) (0.165) (0.180)
Constant -0.9811*** -1.0244*** -0.9567*** -1.0038*** -0.9589*** -1.0070***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Fixed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Audit Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regression of Restatements on Audit Office Political Connectedness and Interaction Term
TABLE 4.4
Likelihood of Accounting Restatements
Measure 1_Res Measure 2_Res Measure 3_Res
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the model of Table 4.3, Panel B, which does not include the interaction term. Finally, 
results are  robust to using OLS  instead  of probit regression estimates. That is, inferences 
are identical under this alternative specification. These findings are in line with the 
argument that politically connected auditors perceive politically connected clients as being 
less risky due to auditors’ own affiliation with political authorities and they are therefore 
less inclined to offer higher quality audits. 
In untabulated tests, I repeat regression (1) for the subsample of politically 
connected firms. This analysis results in 2,981 firm- year observations for the main model 
and 2,887 firm- year observations for the full model. The results show that, for the main 
model, the coefficients on all three measures of political connectedness are positive but 
insignificant. For the full model, however, all three measures are positive and statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This analysis provides evidence that the negative relation 
between audit office political connectedness and client restatement frequency reverses for 
politically connected clients.  
4.5.3 Restatement Frequency and Competing Explanations 
Lower frequency of restatements could be the result of fewer errors and 
irregularities or lack of detection and disclosure of these errors and irregularities 
Observations 18,593 17,330 18,593 17,330 18,593 17,330
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0629 0.0661 0.0636 0.0667 0.0634 0.0664
This table presents the probit regression results of restatement frequency on the three alternative
measures of audit office political connectedness and their interaction with politically connected
firms for the period 2003- 2012. The two alternative specifications per measure differ in the number
of control variables included in each model. See Appendix for variable definitions. P-values are in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels,
respectively. 
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(Srinivasan et al. 2014). This argument is consistent with Correia (2014) who finds that 
politically connected firms are less likely to be involved in an SEC enforcement action 
despite having lower accounting quality (Chaney et al. 2011; Correia 2014). Therefore, the 
negative relation between audit office political connections and the rate of restatements 
could simply reflect low enforcement costs rather than superior audit quality. This is a 
plausible scenario to the extent the auditor political connections capture regulatory 
authorities and are therefore able to enjoy preferential treatment from disciplinary 
agencies. The positive interaction term of the previous analysis provides some initial 
comfort that my results are most likely not driven by lower enforcement. If politically 
connected auditors as well as their clients were less scrutinized by the SEC, then I would 
expect the negative relation between auditor political connections and the rate of 
restatements to be even stronger for politically connected clients or at the very minimum 
not statistically different from non- connected clients. That is not the case as the results of 
Table 4.4 indicate. Nevertheless, to further mitigate concerns that my measures of audit 
office political connections capture variation in audit quality rather than variation in 
enforcement, I conduct two additional tests. 
4.5.4 Placebo Analysis 
In the first test, I run a placebo analysis in which I regress the likelihood of a firm 
restating its financial statements on my audit office political connectedness measures and 
controls. This time, however, my focus is on the restatement announcement year rather 
than the manipulation year. I argue that, if clients of politically connected offices are 
subject to lower enforcement due to the political affiliations of their auditors, then the 
negative relation between office political connections and restatement frequency should  
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Variables
Measure_Res -0.0005 0.0001 -0.0219 -0.0203 -0.0153 -0.0105
(0.910) (0.977) (0.314) (0.374) (0.328) (0.523)
5y Firm PACs -0.0094** -0.0098** -0.0094** -0.0098** -0.0094** -0.0098**
(0.024) (0.022) (0.025) (0.023) (0.025) (0.022)
Office Size -0.0056 -0.0045 -0.0059 -0.0047 -0.0060 -0.0047
(0.447) (0.576) (0.429) (0.558) (0.426) (0.560)
Total Assets -0.0046 -0.0043 -0.0047 -0.0044 -0.0047 -0.0044
(0.712) (0.741) (0.707) (0.734) (0.707) (0.734)
Market-to- Book -0.0052 -0.0060 -0.0052 -0.0060 -0.0052 -0.0060
(0.216) (0.174) (0.214) (0.173) (0.215) (0.174)
Leverage -0.0026 -0.0101 -0.0025 -0.0098 -0.0025 -0.0098
(0.967) (0.884) (0.969) (0.887) (0.969) (0.887)
ROA -0.1078 -0.0643 -0.1073 -0.0643 -0.1074 -0.0642
(0.260) (0.542) (0.262) (0.542) (0.262) (0.542)
Loss 0.1597*** 0.1608*** 0.1591*** 0.1603*** 0.1594*** 0.1605***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num. of Bus. Seg. 0.0977*** 0.0965*** 0.0982*** 0.0971*** 0.0981*** 0.0969***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Num. of Geog. Seg. 0.0336 0.0420 0.0329 0.0413 0.0329 0.0415
(0.187) (0.117) (0.196) (0.123) (0.196) (0.121)
Merger -0.1331*** -0.1612*** -0.1332*** -0.1611*** -0.1332*** -0.1611***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Financing 0.0028 -0.0135 0.0024 -0.0138 0.0023 -0.0137
(0.945) (0.750) (0.954) (0.744) (0.954) (0.746)
Rec. & Inv. - 0.1631 - 0.1626 - 0.1620
(0.122) (0.123) (0.124)
Std ROA - 0.0361 - 0.0350 - 0.0351
(0.644) (0.655) (0.653)
City Leader - 0.0280 - 0.0273 - 0.0276
(0.421) (0.432) (0.427)
National Leader - 0.0121 - 0.0128 - 0.0124
(0.738) (0.723) (0.731)
Constant -2.0433*** -2.1000*** -2.0338*** -2.0903*** -2.0351*** -2.0933***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year Fixed FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Audit Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 18,593 17,299 18,593 17,299 18,593 17,299
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0511 0.0539 0.0512 0.0540 0.0512 0.0539
TABLE 4.5
Placebo Analysis: Restatement Announcement Year rather than Manipulation Year
Likelihood of Accounting Restatements
Measure 1_Res Measure 2_Res Measure 3_Res
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persist when using the restatement announcement year instead of the manipulation year. 
That is, auditors will be less likely to announce a restatement when they are politically 
connected. The new restatement sample that is based only on the announcement year totals 
1,080 restatements. Table 4.5 presents the results of this analysis. Across all alternative 
specifications, my office- level political connectedness measures turn insignificant when I 
use the restatement announcement year rather than the manipulation year. In sharp 
contrast, the firm- specific political connectedness measure remains negative and 
significant under this setup, consistent with the argument that politically connected firms 
are subject to lower enforcement costs. To mitigate concerns that these results are affected 
by the long- term nature of my audit office and firm- specific political connectedness 
measures and the fact that the time lag between restatement announcement and restatement 
manipulation year is typically small13, I repeat the placebo test of Table 4.5 using 
contemporaneous rather than 5-year audit office and firm- specific political connectedness 
measures. In a second step, I gradually increase the difference in years between the two 
dates. That is, I require, in separate steps, that the announcement of the restatement occurs 
after at least one, two, and three years from the restatement manipulation date. In all tests 
(not tabulated) the negative relation between firm political connections and restatement 
                                                            
13 The average time lag between the original financial statement release and a subsequent restatement is roughly 
1.87 years in my sample.  
This table presents the probit regression results of restatement frequency on the three
alternative measures of audit office political connectedness using as restatement year the
year that the restatement was announced instead of the manipulation year. This analysis
covers the period 2003-2012. The two alternative specifications per measure differ in the
number of control variables included in each model. See Appendix for variable definitions. P-
values are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively. 
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frequency persists and remains statistically significant, whereas the relation between 
auditor political connections and restatement frequency is not statistically significant from 
zero14. 
4.5.5 ICW Restatement Sensitivity 
I further test the extent to which the relation between internal control material 
weaknesses (ICW) and restatement frequency varies with the level of audit office political 
connectedness. Prior research has shown that there is a positive link between the quality of 
firms’ internal controls over financial reporting and the rate of restatements (DeFond and 
Jiambalvo 1991; Hammersley et al. 2008; Plumlee and Yohn 2010). Srinivasan et al. 
(2014) argue that variation in this relation could reflect variation in the quality of detection 
and disclosure because if firms conceal their restatements, the positive link between 
restatements and ICW should be weaker.  Therefore, to the extent that the negative relation 
between the rate of restatements and audit office political connectedness reflects lower 
levels of detection and disclosure rather than better audit quality, I expect the relation 
between ICW and restatement frequency to be less positive for politically connected 
offices. To test this prediction I run the following probit model: 
                                                            
14 When performing regression (1) using contemporaneous rather than long-term audit office and firm- specific 
political connectedness measures, I find results consistent with those of Table 4.3, Panel B. That is, under all 
alternative specifications, both audit office and firm- specific measures of political connectedness are negative 
and significant at the 1% or 5% levels. Only Measure 3 in the full model specification is negative and significant 
at the 10% level. 
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𝑹𝑴𝑴𝒕𝑴𝒕𝑴𝒊,𝒕 = 𝑴𝟎 + 𝑴𝟏𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴_𝑹𝑴𝑴+ 𝑴𝟐𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴_𝑹𝑴𝑴𝑿𝟓𝑰 𝑭𝒊𝑴𝑭 𝑷𝑷𝑪 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒊𝑶𝑴𝒕𝑪𝑴𝒊,𝒕+ 𝑴𝟑𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴_𝑹𝑴𝑴𝑿𝟓𝑰 𝑭𝒊𝑴𝑭 𝑷𝑷𝑪 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒊𝑶𝑴𝒕𝑪𝑴𝒊,𝒕𝑿𝑰𝑪𝑾𝒊,𝒕+ 𝑴𝟒𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴𝑴_𝑹𝑴𝑴𝑿𝑰𝑪𝑾𝒊,𝒕+ 𝑴𝟓𝟓𝑰 𝑭𝒊𝑴𝑭 𝑷𝑷𝑪 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒊𝑶𝑴𝒕𝑪𝑴𝒊,𝒕𝑿𝑰𝑪𝑾𝒊,𝒕+ 𝑴𝟔𝟓𝑰 𝑭𝒊𝑴𝑭 𝑷𝑷𝑪 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝒊𝑶𝑴𝒕𝑪𝑴𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑴𝟕𝑰𝑪𝑾𝒊,𝒕 + 𝑪𝑪𝑪𝒕𝑴𝑪𝑪𝑴+ 𝒀𝑴𝑴𝑴 𝑭𝑬 + 𝑰𝑪𝑰𝑴𝑴𝒕𝑴𝑰 𝑭𝑬 + 𝑷𝑴𝑰𝒊𝒕 𝑶𝑶𝑶𝒊𝑶𝑴 𝑭𝑬 + 𝜺𝒊,𝒕  (𝟑), 
where ICWi,t is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a firm reported an internal 
control material weakness (SOX 404), and 0 otherwise. The coefficients of interest in this 
regression are coefficients α4 and α3. Coefficient α4 captures the extent to which the 
sensitivity of restatement frequency to the existence of ICW varies with the level of audit 
office political connectedness, whereas coefficient α3 captures whether this sensitivity is 
statistically significantly different between politically connected and non- politically 
connected firms. Following Srinivasan et al. (2014), I use the original ICW controls and do 
not include those ICW that were issued due to the restatement itself. Furthermore, because 
auditor’s assessment of internal controls became mandatory in November 2004 for US 
accelerated filers, I restrict my sample to include only fiscal years starting from 2005. This 
procedure results in a sample of 11,902 firm- year observations for the full model. I 
present the results of this analysis in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 shows no evidence that the relation between ICW and restatement 
frequency varies with the level of the political connections of auditors for non- politically 
connected firms. In particular, the interaction term of the respective office political 
connectedness measure with the ICW indicator (Measure_Res X ICW) is not statistically
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Variables
Measure_Res -0.0214*** -0.0209*** -0.1458*** -0.1442*** -0.0960*** -0.0923***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Measure_Res X 5y Firm PAC Indicator 0.0253* 0.0327** 0.1754*** 0.2016*** 0.1173*** 0.1340***
(0.050) (0.015) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) (0.002)
Measure_Res X 5y Firm PAC Indicator X ICW -0.0652 -0.0628 -0.5457** -0.5280** -0.3099** -0.2899*
(0.205) (0.241) (0.014) (0.020) (0.045) (0.067)
Measure_Res X ICW 0.0050 0.0027 0.0979 0.0809 0.0678 0.0530
(0.809) (0.901) (0.272) (0.382) (0.323) (0.452)
5y Firm PAC Indicator X ICW 0.3544** 0.3299* 0.3786** 0.3604** 0.3770** 0.3546**
(0.040) (0.059) (0.032) (0.044) (0.031) (0.046)
5y Firm PAC Indicator -0.0867* -0.1052** -0.0803 -0.0992* -0.0810* -0.1001**
(0.078) (0.038) (0.102) (0.050) (0.098) (0.048)
ICW 0.9397*** 0.9356*** 0.9428*** 0.9382*** 0.9403*** 0.9356***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year, Industry, and Audit Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 12,581 11,902 12,581 11,902 12,581 11,902
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0805 0.0826 0.0826 0.0846 0.0817 0.0836
TABLE 4.6
Sensitvity of Restatement Frequency to ICW Conditional on Audit Office Political Connectednes
This table presents the results of probit specifications of the sensitivity of restatement frequency to the effectiveness of
internal control systems for the period 2005- 2012. This analysis is based on the original ICW that were issued prior to
identifying the need to restate earnings The two alternative specifications per measure differ in the number of control
variables included in each model. Controls are not presented for brevity. See Appendix for variable definitions. P-values
are in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
Likelihood of Accounting Restatements
Measure 1_Res Measure 2_Res Measure 3_Res
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different from zero across all three measures and two alternative models. This finding 
suggests that, for non- politically connected firms, the level of political connectedness of 
the auditor does not appear to moderate the positive relation between ICW and client 
restatement frequency. It therefore further mitigates concerns that the negative relation 
between auditor political connections and the rate of restatements could reflect lack of 
detection or disclosure rather than better audit quality. Interestingly, however, this finding 
does not appear to hold for politically connected firms. The results show that the three- 
way interaction term of the corresponding audit office political connectedness measure, the 
firm political connectedness indicator, and the ICW indicator (Measure_Res X 5y Firm 
PAC Indicator X ICW), is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level for 
Measures 2 and 3 and for both the main and full models. This finding provides some 
indication that, politically connected firms are not only more likely to restate their earnings 
when they are being audited by politically connected auditors, but they are also more likely 
to disclose fewer restatements after controlling for the quality of their internal controls.  
Due to the difficulties in interpreting interaction terms in probit specifications, I 
repeat the probit regressions of Table 4.6 using OLS estimators instead. Results are 
qualitatively similar, with the exception of the 3-way interaction term of Measure 3 which 
remains statistically significant, albeit at the 10% level for both main and full models. 
Furthermore, due to the problems in interpreting three- way interaction terms, I regress the 
frequency of accounting restatements on each measure of audit office political 
connectedness, its interaction with the ICW indicator, and the controls of Table 4.6. I 
perform this regression separately for the subsamples of politically and non- politically 
connected clients. I continue to find insignificant coefficients on the ICW interaction term 
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for the subsample of non- politically connected firms for both the main and full models 
and under both probit and OLS specifications. Furthermore, I still find a negative and 
statistically significant ICW interaction term for the second and third measure of audit 
office political connectedness for the subsample of politically connected firms and under 
all alternative specifications. In particular, the corresponding coefficients are significant at 
the 5% level or better15. Overall, the results of these analyses are robust to and, in some 
cases, stronger than original findings. 
4.5.6 Propensity- Matched Control Sample 
It is possible that the relation between audit office political connections and the rate 
of restatements is driven by politically connected offices having lower innate clientele 
restatement risk. Although the inclusion of an extensive set of control variables partly 
addresses this issue, it could the case that politically connected offices have clients with 
lower ex- ante probability of restatements. Under this scenario, the results on audit office 
political connectedness could simply reflect a clientele effect rather than the effect of audit 
office political connectedness on the frequency of restatements. To mitigate these 
concerns, I use propensity-score matching technique. For each measure, I estimate a first- 
stage probit model in which the dependent variable is equal to one if a firm is audited by 
an office with above median value of political connectedness, and zero otherwise. The 
independent variables are firm- specific controls of the full model, i.e., 5y Firm PAC 
Indicator, Total Assets, Market- to- Book, Leverage, ROA, Loss, Num. of Business 
Segments, Num. of Geographic Segments, Merger, Financing, Receivables & Inventory, 
                                                            
15 The coefficient on the ICW interaction term is significant at the 1% level in the OLS specifications of the both 
the main and full models of Measure 2. In all other specifications, the related interaction term is significant at the 
5% level. 
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and Std ROA. Moreover, I include in this probit specification industry, year, and audit firm 
fixed effects. I subsequently match, without replacement, one observation that has above 
median value of audit office political connectedness with one that does not, based on the 
closest predicted value from previous probit regression, while allowing a maximum caliper 
 distance of 3%. This procedure yields sample sizes that range from 11,838 to 13,135 firm-  
 
Variables
Measure_Res_M -0.1052*** -0.1049*** -0.1610*** -0.1611*** -0.0899** -0.0908***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.010)
Interaction 0.1944** 0.1930** 0.3012*** 0.2995*** 0.2609*** 0.2600***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001)
5y Firm PAC Ind. -0.2252*** -0.2282*** -0.2856*** -0.2876*** -0.2786*** -0.2811***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry FE
Audit Firm FE
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 13,135 13,135 11,838 11,838 13,087 13,087
Pseudo R-Squared 0.0691 0.0694 0.0716 0.0721 0.0674 0.0679
This table presents the probit regression results of restatement frequency on median- based
indicators of the three alternative measures of audit office political connectedness and their
interaction with politically connected firms for the period 2003- 2012. This analysis is based on 
a propensity score- matched sample which is created by matching one firm- year observation
that is audited by an office with above median value of political connectdness with one that is
audited by an office with below median value of political connectedness. The matching is
performed separately for each political connectedness measure and is based on the firm-
specific controls of the full model that account for innate clientele restatement risk. The two
alternative specifications per measure differ in the number of control variables included in
each model. See Appendix for variable definitions. P-values are in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate significance at the two-tailed 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
TABLE 4.7
Propensity Score- Matched Sample
Likelihood of Accounting Restatements
Measure 1_Res Measure 2_Res Measure 3_Res
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year observations depending on the measure16. Table 4.7 presents the results of the 
propensity score- matched sample regressions. 
Table 4.7 shows that main findings are robust to this alternative specification. All 
three measures are negative and statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels. 
Furthermore, the coefficient of the interaction term between the corresponding audit office 
political connectedness measure and the firm political connectedness indicator 
(Measure_Res X 5y Firm PAC Indicator) is positive and significant at the 1% and 5% 
levels across all alternative measures and in both main and full models. Once again, OLS 
estimation yields identical results. Overall, these findings suggest that the relation between 
auditor political connectedness and client restatement frequency is not driven by politically 
connected offices having a less risky clientele base. 
4.6 Conclusion 
The political connections of firms have garnered considerable research attention the 
past few years. Until now, accounting literature has mainly focused on the accounting 
quality consequences of politically connected firms, reviving Stigler’s theory of regulatory 
capture in an accounting context. Yet, despite growing public focus on the lobbying 
activities of audit firms, there is still little and inconclusive evidence regarding the audit 
quality consequences of the political connections of auditors. In this paper, I attempt to 
close this gap in the literature and investigate the relation between auditor political 
connections and client restatement frequency at the audit office level. To this end, I 
retrieve all Big 4 employee PAC contributions to members of committees directly 
                                                            
16 Few observations drop when including industry fixed effects in the probit specifications. 
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responsible for auditor regulation and oversight and create a dataset that spans from 2003 
to 2012. I argue that politically connected auditors are more likely to offer high quality 
audits due to stronger reputation and litigation considerations as well as network- related 
information and knowledge acquisition benefits. My results are consistent with these 
arguments. Clients of politically connected offices are less likely to restate their earnings. 
This finding is robust to a battery of tests aimed at investigating the extent to which 
variation in restatement frequency reflects variation in audit quality or variation in the level 
of enforcement. I further find that the negative relation between the rate of restatements 
and audit office political connectedness does not appear to persist for politically connected 
firms for which the likelihood of an audit quality compromise is significantly higher. 
This paper contributes to the literature by being one of the first to investigate the 
audit quality consequences of the political activities of auditors at the audit office level. 
My results indicate that there is a positive relation between the political connections of 
auditors and audit quality and therefore, on average, auditor- and firm- specific political 
connections affect accounting quality in opposite directions. This is true, however, only for 
non- politically connected clients. This latter finding suggests that, to the extent that 
auditors perceive politically connected clients as less risky due to their own political 
affiliations or even explicitly lobby on their behalf, the audit quality concerns of regulators 
about audit firms’ lobbying activities may not be unfounded. Future research can explore 
other settings in which politically connected auditors are likely to compromise their 
independence as well as whether the political connections of the local engagement office 
affect auditor choice. 
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Appendix C 
Panel A: Dependent Variable 
Restate An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if the 
firm- year is subsequently misstated, and zero 
otherwise.  
 
Panel B: Test Variables   
Measure 1  The 5-year sum of dollar PACs targeting 
auditor- relevant politicians per Big 4 audit 
firm- office- fiscal year. 
Measure 2 The 5- year sum of distinct per year auditor- 
relevant politicians targeted per Big 4 audit 
firm- office- fiscal year. 
Measure 3 The 5- year sum of distinct per year employees 
making PAC contributions to auditor- relevant 
politicians per Big 4 audit firm- office - fiscal 
year.  
Measure_Res The residuals from the regression of the 
logarithmic transformation of each political 
connectedness measure on office size.  
Measure_Res_M An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a 
firm is audited by an office with above median 
value of political connectedness for the 
corresponding measure, and 0 otherwise.  
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Panel C: Control Variables 
5y Firm PACs The 5- year sum of total firm- specific dollar 
PAC contributions.  
5y Firm PAC Indicator An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a 
firm has made PAC contributions over the last 5 
years, and 0 otherwise.  
Office Size The natural logarithm of the audit fees of all 
clients of the office minus the audit fees of the 
corresponding client. 
Total Assets The natural logarithm of total assets.  
Market- to- Book The ratio of market value of equity to book 
value of equity. 
Leverage The ratio of long- term debt to lagged total 
assets. 
ROA The ratio of net income to lagged total assets. 
Loss An indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm 
reports negative net income, and zero otherwise. 
Num. of Business Segments The natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
business segments. 
Num. of Geographic Segments The natural logarithm of one plus the number of 
geographic segments. 
Merger An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a 
firm has engaged in a merger or acquisition in 
the corresponding fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
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Financing An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if 
Merger is equal to zero and number of shares 
outstanding increased by at least 10% or long- 
term debt increased by at least 20%, and zero 
otherwise.  
Receivables & Inventory The ratio of receivables plus inventory to lagged 
total assets. 
Std ROA The 5- year standard deviation of ROA. 
City Leader An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an 
office is the number one auditor in terms of 
aggregated client audit fees in an industry within 
that city in a specific fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise. 
National Leader An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if an 
auditor is the number one auditor in an industry 
in terms of aggregated audit fees in a specific 
fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. 
ICW An indicator variable that takes the value 1 if a 
firm reported an internal control material 
weakness (SOX 404) prior to identifying the 
need to restate earnings, and 0 otherwise. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
The purpose of this dissertation is to investigate determinants and consequences of 
financial reporting quality. In chapter 2, I investigate the association between attributes of 
accounting earnings and private firms’ access to two main sources of financing: bank debt 
and trade credit capital. Using a sample of private firms from the European Union’s five 
largest economies (United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy, and Spain) during the period 
1997- 2010, I find that financial reporting quality is associated with a lower cost of debt 
and lower levels of short to total debt. Furthermore, high quality financial reporting is 
associated with better access to trade credit financing. Overall, the findings of chapter 2 
suggest that the financial reporting choices of private firms do have economic implications 
despite the presence of private communication channels that serve as alternative 
information asymmetry- mitigating mechanisms.  
In chapter 3, I investigate the link between auditor size and audit quality in a setting 
where Big 4 auditors have reduced incentives to retain their audit quality advantage, i.e., 
the private firm market of a low book- tax conformity country (the U.K.). I find that clients 
of non- Big 4 auditors have lower levels of absolute discretionary accruals, better accrual 
quality, lower levels of absolute total accruals to absolute cash flow from operations, and 
greater likelihood to receive a qualified auditor opinion compared to Big 4 clients. I report 
no statistically significant differences in the level of earnings smoothness. The results are 
robust to a battery of alternative specifications, including a propensity- score matched 
sample analysis. Overall, these findings provide evidence of a non- Big 4 audit quality 
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advantage in the private firm market when Big 4 auditor incentives to deliver high quality 
audits become sufficiently weak. 
In chapter 4, I focus on the political connections of Big 4 accounting firms with 
members of committees directly responsible for auditor regulation and oversight and 
investigate the relation between auditor political connections and the restatement 
frequency of their clients at the audit office level. I report that clients of politically 
connected offices are less likely to restate their earnings. However, in sharp contrast to the 
findings of prior literature on the political connections of firms, I find no evidence that the 
political connections of auditors are associated with lower enforcement by regulatory 
agencies. I further report that the negative relation between audit office political 
connections and client restatement frequency does not persist for politically connected 
clients. That is, precisely for those audit engagements for which politically connected 
auditors are most likely to compromise their independence. 
Overall, the results of chapter 2 suggest that the financial reporting quality of 
private firms do have economic consequences despite lower demand for high quality 
financial reporting. Chapter 3 suggests that, in the absence of strong reputation, litigation, 
and regulatory oversight considerations the otherwise positive relation between auditor 
size and audit quality reverses in the private firm market. Chapter 4 highlights the audit 
quality consequences of the political connections of auditors.  
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Summary in Dutch 
 
Het doel van deze dissertatie is om de oorzaken en gevolgen te onderzoeken van de 
kwaliteit van financiële verslaggeving. In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik de relatie tussen 
eigenschappen van boekhoudkundige resultaten en de toegang die private ondernemingen 
hebben tot twee belangrijke bronnen van financiering: bancaire leningen en handelskrediet. 
Gebruikmakend van een steekproef van private ondernemingen uit de vijf grootste 
economieën van de Europese Unie (Verenigd Koninkrijk, Duitsland, Frankrijk, Italië en 
Spanje) in de periode 1997-2010 is mijn bevinding dat de kwaliteit van financiële 
verslaggeving gerelateerd is aan lagere kosten van vreemd vermogen en een kleinere 
verhouding van kort vreemd vermogen tot totaal vreemd vermogen. Daarnaast is een hoge 
kwaliteit van financiële verslaggeving gerelateerd aan betere toegang tot handelskrediet. In 
het algemeen suggereren de bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2 dat de keuzes van private 
ondernemingen omtrent financiële verslaggeving economische implicaties hebben, 
ondanks de aanwezigheid van private communicatiekanalen die als alternatieve 
mechanismen ter reductie van informatie-asymmetrie dienen. 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik de link tussen de grootte van de accountant en de 
kwaliteit van de audit in een situatie waarin accountants van de big 4 verminderde 
incentives hebben om hun voordeel op de kwaliteit van de audit te behouden; d.w.z. de 
markt van private ondernemingen in een land met grote verschillen tussen de fiscale en 
commerciële boekhouding (het Verenigd Koninkrijk). Mijn bevinding is dat cliënten van 
niet Big 4- accountancykantoren lagere niveaus van absolute discretionaire accruals, een 
betere kwaliteit van accruals, lagere verhoudingen van absolute totale accruals tot absolute 
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operationele kasstromen en een grotere kans op het ontvangen van een 
accountantsverklaring dan Big 4-cliënten. Ik rapporteer geen statistisch significante 
verschillen in de earnings management. De resultaten zijn robust onder een serie 
alternatieve specificities, waaronder een propensity-score matched sample-analyse. In hun 
geheel bieden deze vondsten bewijs dat niet Big 4 accountancykantoren een 
kwaliteitsvoordeel bieden in de markt voor private ondernemingen wanneer de incentives 
van Big 4 accountancykantoren om audits van hoge kwaliteit te doen zwak genoeg 
worden. 
In hoofdstuk 4 richt ik mij op de politieke connecties tussen Big 4 
accountancykantoren en commissieleden die direct verantwoordelijk zijn voor de 
regulering van en toezicht op accountants; ik onderzoek de relatie, op het niveau van 
accountancyvestiging, tussen politieke connecties van auditors en de frequentie de 
jaarverslagen van hun cliënten wordt herzien. Ik rapporteer dat cliënten van vestigingen 
met politieke connecties minder vaak hun resultaten herzien/corrigeren. Echter vind ik, in 
scherp contrast met de bevindingen in voorgaande literatuur over de politieke connecties 
van ondernemingen, geen bewijs dat de politieke connecties van accountants gerelateerd 
zijn aan minder strenge handhaving door toezichthouders. Verder rapporteer ik dat de 
negatieve relatie tussen de politieke connecties van accountants en de frequentie van 
restatements van hun cliënten niet houdt voor cliënten die zelf politieke connecties hebben. 
Dat wil zeggen: juist voor die audit-opdrachten waarbij het het meest waarschijnlijk is dat 
accountants met politieke connecties hun onafhankelijkheid compromitteren. 
In het algemeen suggereren de resultaten van hoofdstuk 2 dat de kwaliteit van de 
financiële verslaggeving van private ondernemingen wel degelijk economische 
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consequenties heeft, ondanks de mindere vraag naar financiële verslaggeving van hoge 
kwaliteit. Hoofdstuk 3 suggereert dat wanneer reputationele, gerechtelijke en regulatieve 
overwegingen geen grote rol spelen, de anderszins positieve relatie tussen de grootte van 
de accountancykantoor en de kwaliteit van de audit omkeert in de markt voor private 
ondernemingen. Hoofdstuk 4 benadrukt de consequenties voor de kwaliteit van audits van 
de politieke connecties van accountants. 
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Summary in Greek 
 
H παρούσα διατριβή ερευνά παράγοντες που διαμορφώνουν την ποιότητα των 
χρηματοοικονομικών καταστάσεων καθώς και τις συνέπειες που απορρέουν από τη χρήση 
υψηλής ποιότητας λογιστικών καταστάσεων. Το κεφάλαιο 2 ερευνά τη σχέση μεταξύ της 
ποιότητας των χρηματοοικονομικών καταστάσεων και της πρόσβασης των μη εισηγμένων 
εταιριών σε δύο βασικές μορφές δανεισμού: του τραπεζικού δανεισμού καθώς και της 
προμήθειας με πίστωση. Συγκεκριμένα, το κεφάλαιο 2 επικεντρώνεται στις μη εισηγμένες 
εταιρίες των πέντε μεγαλύτερων οικονομιών της Ευρώπης, δηλαδή της Μεγάλης 
Βρετανίας, της Γαλλία, της Γερμανίας, της Ιταλίας και της Ισπανίας για την περίοδο 1997- 
2010. Τα αποτελέσματα δείχνουν ότι μη εισηγμένες εταιρίες με υψηλής ποιότητας 
λογιστικές καταστάσεις χαρακτηρίζονται από χαμηλότερο κόστος δανεισμού και κάνουν 
μεγαλύτερη χρήση μακροπρόθεσμου δανεισμού, ενώ παράλληλα επιτυγχάνουν 
μεγαλύτερη πίστωση στην αγορά προμηθειών. Συμπερασματικά, η ποιότητα των 
λογιστικών καταστάσεων επιφέρει οικονομικές συνέπειες ακόμα και για τις μη εισηγμένες 
εταιρίες, οι οποίες κατά γενική ομολογία χρησιμοποιούν εναλλακτικούς μηχανισμούς 
μείωσης της ασύμμετρης πληροφόρησης μεταξύ αυτών και  των πιστωτών τους. 
Το κεφάλαιο 3 εξετάζει τη σχέση μεταξύ του μεγέθους των ελεγκτικών εταιριών 
και των προσφερόμενων από αυτές υπηρεσιών για τις μη εισηγμένες εταιρίες της Μεγάλης 
Βρετανίας, οι οποίες λειτουργούν σε ένα περιβάλλον χαμηλής εποπτείας από τις αρμόδιες 
ρυθμιστικές αρχές και χαμηλού κινδύνου δικαστικής αγωγής εναντίον τους. Επιπρόσθετα, 
στη Μεγάλη Βρετανία οι λογιστικές καταστάσεις χρησιμοποιούνται σε μικρότερο βαθμό 
ως βάση για τις φορολογικές καταστάσεις. Το γεγονός αυτό, μειώνει σημαντικά την 
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πιθανότητα εποπτείας των ελεγκτικών εταιριών από τις αρμόδιες φορολογικές αρχές. 
Χρησιμοποιώντας ένα δείγμα μη εισηγμένων εταιριών από το 2005 έως το 2012, το 
κεφάλαιο 3 δείχνει ότι οι μικρές ελεγκτικές εταιρίες παρέχουν υψηλότερης ποιότητας 
ελεγκτικές υπηρεσίες σε σύγκριση με τις ελεγκτικές εταιρίες μεγαλύτερου μεγέθους. 
Συμπερασματικά, το κεφάλαιο 3 καταδυκνείει την ύπαρξη ενός πλεονεκτήματος στην 
παροχή υψηλής ποιότητας ελεγκτικών εταιριών από τις μικρές ελεγκτικές εταιρίες υπό 
συνθήκες χαμηλών κινήτρων παροχής ποιοτικών ελεγκτικών υπηρεσιών από τις 
ελεγκτικές εταιρίες μεγάλου μεγέθους.  
Το κεφάλαιο 4 εξετάζει την επίδραση των πολιτικών διασυνδέσεων των ελεγκτικών 
εταιριών στην ποιότητα των προσφερόμενων ελεγκτικών υπηρεσιών. Έρευνα στο χώρο 
της λογιστικής έχει δείξει ότι οι εταιρίες που έχουν πολιτικές διασυνδέσεις έχουνε 
χαμηλής ποιότητας λογιστικές καταστάσεις και απολαμβάνουν μειωμένης εποπτείας από 
τις αρμόδιες ρυθμιστικές αρχές. Ο βασικός σκοπός του τέταρτου κεφαλαίου είναι να 
εξετάσει τη σχέση μεταξύ των πολιτικών διασυνδέσεων των ελεγκτικών εταιριών και των 
προσφερόμενων από αυτές ελεγκτικών υπηρεσιών σε επίπεδο περιφερειακού ελεγκτικού 
γραφείου. Χρησιμοποιώντας ένα δείγμα πολιτικών συνεισφορών υπαλλήλων των 
τεσσάρων μεγαλύτερων ελεγκτικών εταιριών των ΗΠΑ σε μέλη επιτροπών υπεύθυνων σε 
θέματα εποπτείας για την περίοδο 2003-2012, το κεφάλαιο 4 δείχνει ότι πελάτες πολιτικά 
συνδεδεμένων ελεγκτικών εταιριών έχουνε χαμηλότερη πιθανότητα να 
επαναδιατυπώσουνε τις λογιστικές τους καταστάσεις. Σε αντίθεση όμως με τα ευρήματα 
αναφορικά με τις πολιτικές διασυνδέσεις των ίδιων των πελατών, οι πολιτικές 
διασυνδέσεις των ελεγκτικών εταιριών δε φαίνεται να σχετίζονται με χαμηλότερα επίπεδα 
εποπτείας από τις αρμόδιες ρυθμιστικές αρχές. Η θετική όμως σχέση μεταξύ των 
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πολιτικών διασυνδέσεων των ελεγκτικών εταιριών και της ποιότητας των παρεχόμενων 
από αυτές υπηρεσιών παύει να υφίσταται στην περίπτωση πελατών που είναι οι ίδιοι 
πολιτικά συνδεδεμένοι. Αυτό το εύρημα καταδεικνύει ότι οι πολιτικά συνδεδεμένες 
ελεγκτικές εταιρίες προσφέρουν χαμηλότερης ποιότητας ελεγκτικές υπηρεσίες σε εκείνους 
τους πελάτες που είναι λιγότερο πιθανό να ελεγχθούν από τις εποπτικές αρχές.  
Συμπερασματικά, το δεύτερο κεφάλαιο δείχνει ότι η ποιότητα των λογιστικών 
καταστάσεων έχει οικονομικές συνέπειες ακόμα και υπό καθεστώς μειωμένης 
χρησιμότητάς τους. Το τρίτο κεφάλαιο καταγράφει την ύπαρξη μιας αρνητικής σχέσης 
μεταξύ του μεγέθους των ελεγκτικών εταιριών και της ποιότητας των παρεχόμενων 
ελεγκτικών υπηρεσιών υπό συνθήκες επαρκώς μειωμένων κινήτρων παροχής υψηλής 
ποιότητας ελεγκτικών υπηρεσιών από τις μεγάλες ελεγκτικές εταιρίες. Τέλος, το τέταρτο 
κεφάλαιο φωτίζει τις συνέπειες των πολιτικών διασυνδέσεων των ελεγκτικών εταιριών 
στην ποιότητα των παρεχόμενων υπηρεσιών.  
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